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ABSTRACT

The document contains a paper on the prosocial theorists' approach to moral/citizenship education and three critiques of the paper. Prosocial theorists focus on specific kinds of behavior which can be associated with moral theory: altruism, guilt, helping, cooperation, resistance to temptation, impulse control, and empathy. The work has been carried out principally in laboratories. The paper considers theoretical issues, methodological limitations, and the desirability of certain methodological approaches. The author summarizes past research and suggests further questions and directions. Particular areas for research include the parent-child relationship and techniques such as conditioning, modeling, reasoning, induction, and indirect instruction. Research on peer influence and peers as socializers is also suggested. The first critique raises questions concerning the emphasis on the training of moral judgments rather than behavior, the lack of knowledge concerning real world reinforcement, and the lack of data on restraints on children's helping. The second critique views the paper as providing both a practical and theoretical basis for instructional programs on moral education. The final critique comments on the paper with reference to the person variables which determine prosocial conduct, the consistency of prosocial behavior across situations, and the factors which affect the development of prosocial tendencies.

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THE PROSOCIAL THEORISTS' APPROACH TO
MORAL/CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
MORAL/CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION CONFERENCE
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

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PREFACE

This pamphlet, one of a series of four, contains a major paper on moral education and three critiques of that paper. The paper was presented at a national Conference on Moral/Citizenship Education held in June of 1976, and the critiques were commissioned independent of the conference. Three other major presentations at that conference, and accompanying critiques, comprise the companion pamphlets to this one. Each pamphlet sets forth and illuminates one of four theoretical approaches to moral education: cognitive-decision theory, developmental theory, prosocial theory/research, and values theory. These approaches were selected because it was felt that they represent areas of research, development, and writing which have had the most significant impact on the field.

Although the series is conceived as a unit providing an overview of selected moral-education perspectives, each pamphlet is intended to stand alone as representative and expository of one specific approach.

Conference Background

The conference at which the papers were presented was a highlight of a 1975-76 yearlong planning effort carried out by Research for Better Schools (RBS) under contract with the National Institute of Education (NIE). The conference brought together approximately 85 experts representing a

variety of viewpoints and interests.

The primary purpose of the conference (in addition to facilitating an exchange of information across the field) was to develop moral/citizenship education recommendations from as wide a base as possible concerning research, development, and dissemination. The key process was one of interaction, with work groups arriving at recommendations on the basis of the four major informational papers collected in this publication series, and work-group deliberations. The recommendations were then submitted to NIE and the public.

On the basis of the conference recommendations, a coordinated plan of R, D, & D for moral/citizenship education (at that time termed ethical-citizenship education) was developed which has the endorsement of a wide and influential constituency. Work is in progress to advocate and implement that plan.

In the past year Moral/Citizenship Education and Ethical-Citizenship Education have merged as a broadly conceived Citizen Education component of RBS. The front and back matter of this pamphlet summarizes aspects of that component, including objectives, affiliations, and resources.

The Prosocial Approach to Moral Education

The major paper and critiques in this pamphlet deal with the prosocial approach to moral education, a brief summary

of which follows. This highly condensed statement can portray only the most general characteristics of the prosocial perspective. It is included here simply to orient the reader, not to define the field.

The prosocial theorists are characterized by their focus upon specific kinds of behaviors which can be associated with moral theory. These behaviors include such areas as altruism, guilt, helping, cooperation, resistance to temptation, impulse control, and empathy. Individuals are viewed, in the main, as objects to be manipulated and trained. This approach has generated considerable experimental research, with the major objective of describing and/or predicting behaviors, dispositions, and/or reports of affect. The studies emphasize empirical validity and sophisticated research methodology, a distinguishing characteristic of the work of the prosocial theorists. The prosocial theoretical perspective is also characterized by fragmentation and by virtually no implementation in the classroom. The work to date has been carried out principally in laboratories, with small samples of subjects, or has depended upon field survey work. A few theorists are beginning to consider the possibility of applying what has been learned about prosocial measurement and treatment effects in the field of education. If we were to project the educational objective of this position, it probably would be to change behaviors, dispositions, and

personal affective experience in a socially desirable direction. The prosocial approach awaits a strong unifying theory and presently exists as the outgrowth of experiments based on several learning and behavior theories. As indicated, workers in this field are primarily research psychologists.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: DIRECTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH AND APPLICATIONS TO EDUCATION

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A variety of theoretical issues with regard to the development of prosocial behavior are considered, together with some methodological limitations of past research and the desirability of certain methodological approaches. Research findings on socialization and development are summarized. Suggestions are made concerning further research questions and directions that grow out of these findings or are otherwise important. Procedures to increase prosocial orientation and prosocial behavior, mostly based on research findings, are also suggested. The focus of particular content areas for research and application includes aspects of the parent-child relationship (e.g., warmth/hostility, control/missiveness); techniques such as conditioning, modeling, reasoning, and induction; and indirect instruction. The last technique refers to guiding children to interpersonal experiences and/or participation in prosocial behavior: teaching others, participating in activities that benefit others, and/or focusing responsibility on children for others' welfare. Finally, research on peer influence and peers as socializers of each other is suggested.

In the last decade there has been a dramatic rise of interest in sharing, helping, cooperating, and other behaviors which have come to be called prosocial. Such behaviors benefit others and usually demand from the actor some cost or sacrifice such as time, material possessions, effort, or

Any research by the author that was conducted after 1973 and is cited or discussed in this paper was supported by a grant from the National Institutes of Health, Grant Number MH 23886. This research was conducted primarily in the Amherst schools. Jeffrey Lowell has proofread and commented on the copy-edited manuscript.

energy. In spite of such cost, prosocial behavior is not necessarily perceived by the actor as requiring sacrifice. Motives to perform prosocial acts that derive from prior learning may lead people to identify with another person or his goals, so that gratification from helping is anticipated.

The willingness or unwillingness to behave prosocially has clear relevance to morality, which concerns conduct that has consequences for the welfare of others. This paper relates both to the kind of prosocial behaviors that are performed in response to another person's need for help and the capacity or willingness to initiate and maintain friendly, positive interactions and to respond positively to others' initiatives. Positive behavior is likely to be reciprocated and thereby contributes to adjustment and satisfaction in personal relationships. By contributing to positive modes of interaction, the tendency to behave prosocially also contributes to the harmonious functioning of social groups.

How can the tendency to behave prosocially be developed or increased? What styles of interacting with children--methods or procedures of child rearing and experiences provided by parents, teachers, or other socializers--will contribute to children's tendency to behave prosocially? What does existing research show in this regard, and what new research is needed to support conceptions that one can advance

at this time? These are questions to which this paper is addressed.

Let us first examine more closely what is meant by the tendency to behave prosocially. At this point in our understanding of the determinants of human behavior it would be naive to assume that people behave consistently at different times, under different circumstances. However, while the early findings of Hartshorne and May (1929) have been used to question whether there is any consistency in behavior, it seems reasonable to make two claims on the basis of existing research and the reasoning that follows from such findings: First, there is some consistency in behavior. Even the children whom Hartshorne and May studied showed some consistency in their honesty; a reanalysis of the data (Burton, 1963) showed a significant although not very high intercorrelation (about $r = .30$) among different measures of honesty, some of them administered under quite different circumstances. Recently a number of experiments showed some consistency in children's prosocial behavior, for example, between two measures of donations (Midlarsky & Bryan, 1972) and between behavioral and cognitive measures of positive reactions to others (Bryan, 1975; Dlugokinski & Firestone, 1973, 1974; Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977; Rushton, 1976; Staub, 1978b).

The second claim that can be made is that behavior is predictable. I earlier advanced a conception of what we

need to know and what psychological processes must be considered in order to predict behavior successfully (Staub, 1974, 1978b; Staub & Feinberg, 1977). (The conceptual analyses in the rest of the paper do not depend on the correctness of this conception.) If we observe children's behavior over an extended period of time and under many circumstances, I believe we will find the following: Those children who have learned to a greater degree certain values that promote prosocial behavior (e.g, helpfulness, generosity, concern about others' welfare), and who have also learned prosocial behaviors to express such values in action, will tend to behave more prosocially than others who have learned such values to a lesser degree. Consistency and stability over time in dependency and in other personal characteristics have been found when behavior was extensively sampled or when personal characteristics were evaluated in depth in interviews and personality tests (Block, 1977). Moreover, there is some evidence of differences among adults in their prosocial orientation, in a set of interrelated values that are associated with differences in prosocial actions (Staub, 1978b). The two major components of prosocial orientation appear to be emphasis on the importance of, and sense of personal responsibility for, others' welfare.

The expression of a person's prosocial orientation in any one instance may depend on surrounding circumstances and on

other aspects of his personality. A particular situation may potentially activate a variety of personal goals as well as corresponding behaviors to pursue the achievement of these goals. Whether it does so depends both on varied characteristics of the person and which of those personal goals are important for that person. For example, Child A may be working on a task when Child B appears to be in physical or psychological distress. For Child A, this situation may activate a prosocial orientation (and the associated goal of helping another in need), or his personal goal of doing well on the task, or both. If Child A holds values that make the goal of helping another child important, he will have no conflict in attempting to help Child B--as long as Child A does not care about performing well on his task; but conflict will arise for Child A if both goals are important for him. The resulting behavior is more difficult to predict, for prediction depends on knowledge of the different values of Child A and the goals that they give rise to, an accurate assessment of the activating potential of the situation, and a theory that successfully deals with the manner in which goal conflicts are resolved.

For the purpose of this analysis I have simplified this situation so that only two goals are activated; but of course more than two are often relevant. Under many circumstances children feel that they ought to be working on their tasks;

they want to behave in a socially approved, proper manner. This goal, when activated, can interfere with helping. Also likely to affect any attempt to give assistance to those in need is the ability to provide it.

This brief discussion of the meaning of the tendency to behave prosocially points to two issues. First, such a tendency depends not only on the degree to which a child has learned values and beliefs about helping others but also on further aspects of the child's personality and on his other values. Thus, when a child behaves prosocially on one occasion and not on another, little can be concluded about the strength and nature of the child's prosocial values or his empathic capacity. Further, lack of a high degree of consistency on a few occasions does not mean that intervention has been unsuccessful in either promoting prosocial orientation or increasing prosocial behavior. Success must be measured by considering behavior across many situations.

Second, it is possible that an important aspect of developing prosocial values and behavior is to teach children discrimination: to educate them about the circumstances under which helping others is more important than following rules of polite, appropriate social behavior or pursuing other personal goals. Clearly, we do not want to teach children that when someone drops a pencil at the other end of the room they should disrupt everything and run to pick up the pencil. We

probably want to teach them that helping another child in severe physical distress supersedes both the obligation to continue working on a task and such rules of polite social behavior that prohibit children from entering an adjoining room without permission. Young children apparently must be taught such discriminations (Staub, 1970b, 1971b).

Probably the clarification of our own values ought to accompany the education of children in prosocial behavior. Most of us would agree that children should learn to be concerned about others' welfare, to regard helpfulness and cooperation as important. But we would agree to a lesser extent concerning the desirable resolution of specific conflicts between one's own goals and others' needs. I am suggesting that children need to learn, minimally, that attempting to help someone in apparently great need will not result in criticism and negative evaluation because prohibitions that hold on other occasions have been transgressed.

THEORETICAL AND RESEARCH ISSUES

Before an examination of specific relationships between children and socializers and child-rearing methods that contribute to prosocial orientation, I would like to discuss briefly several theoretical issues and approaches to future research.

In order to understand development, we need to consider

the determinants of prosocial behavior--that is, the personality characteristics that must develop if children and adults are to behave prosocially. Although I cannot give a detailed review here of the literature pertinent to these determinants (Bryan, 1975; Hoffman, 1975b; Krebs, 1970; Staub, 1974, 1975a, 1975b, 1978a, 1978b), I will make a few general statements on the basis of the existing research findings.

Very young children behave prosocially because of primitive empathy or early and necessarily primitive role-taking capacity (Hoffman, 1975b), which may develop further with age and experience. However, young children probably behave prosocially in most ways because they have learned that others expect them to do so; thus they gain praise and reward and/or avoid disapproval and punishment. Progressively with age, children may internalize or develop values and standards. As this happens they may also reward themselves for behaving prosocially or punish themselves for not doing so when the circumstances require such behavior.

The manner in which the child's morally relevant values can be categorized has been strongly debated by cognitive developmentalists, social-learning theorists, advocates of identification and internalization, and others. Probably children who tend to behave prosocially do not simply learn a particular value or values (e.g., it is good to be helpful); rather they develop value orientations that lead them

to prosocial responding and/or to a desire to enhance others' welfare. The levels of moral reasoning differentiated by cognitive developmentalists (Kohlberg, 1969, 1976) may be regarded as different values orientations. Several writers (Durkheim, 1961; Hoffman, 1970; Staub, 1975a) have emphasized individual differences in orientation toward the world--differences in terms of concern about human welfare, concern about the external consequences of one's behavior, acceptance of conventional values and standards and obedience to them. These different values orientations are likely to have varied consequences on prosocial behavior. Prosocial orientation as a value orientation may lead to prosocial behavior under the widest range of circumstances, since it embodies concern about the welfare of other human beings and a sense of personal responsibility to contribute to their welfare (Staub, 1974, 1978b).

Children can not only acquire values but also develop differentially the capacity to view events from others' points of view (role taking). Further, they can develop the capacity and tendency to experience others' emotional states vicariously (empathy). Internalized values and empathy have usually been regarded as separate entities, different products of socialization and experience. This may be unjustified. Current theories of emotion strongly suggest that thoughts and the assessment or interpretation of events can

be the determinants of emotional reactions (Lazarus & Averill, 1972; Leventhal, 1974; Schacter & Singer, 1962). It is reasonable to expect that certain value orientations by children are likely to lead to assessments of particular situations that will give rise to empathic reactions, while other values and assessments will not (see Staub, 1975a, 1978b). This hypothesis implies that the relationship between different values or value orientations and empathic reactivity ought to be explored. Alternatively, empathy may be the result of conditioning; this, of course, does not mean that it has no cognitive components, as later discussion will suggest. Finally, it is not impossible that a primitive empathic reactivity is a part of the biological inheritance of human beings (Hoffman, 1975b).

To date, research has identified many basic dimensions of socialization practices that are probably important for the development of prosocial behavior and other positive characteristics. However, our knowledge about their influence remains tentative because most of the investigations have been analogue research: small laboratory studies which show how the influence of particular procedures affect children but which do not convince us that these procedures work the same way in everyday life when administered by people who have much more extensive relationships to the children. Fortunately, research findings from laboratory studies and from

naturalistic studies have been consistent, although not uniformly so. (Naturalistic studies are research studies in which parental child-rearing practices are evaluated by interviewing the parents or the children or both, or by observing parent-child interactions; the relationship of these practices to children's characteristics, values, and behavior is examined.)

To approximate the everyday world in laboratory research, larger-scale studies are needed. I am not suggesting that small studies are not desirable but rather that the main direction should be toward more elaborate investigations. Moreover, the research should attempt to approximate to a greater degree the life circumstances of the child, so that findings can be regarded as having reasonable "ecological validity," that is, relevance to the child's everyday experience.

In laboratory research it is important to evaluate the generalized effects of particular learning opportunities. We want to know to what degree training will increase prosocial behavior that is related, but not identical, to the kind of behavior involved in the training experience. To what degree will prosocial behavior be greater under circumstances different from those in the original training? How durable are the effects? More generally, what kind of learning took place? Did the procedures simply increase

the social desirability of children behaving in certain ways, or did they affect behavior for other reasons? To answer the last question, we must determine the degree to which cognitive changes resulted from the procedures, that is, changes in the children's evaluation of particular behaviors and changes in their perception and evaluation of the meaning of particular situations (e.g., other people's needs).

To measure generalization properly, we may first have to determine the degree to which different needs and different prosocial behaviors are perceived by children from the same general population as the subjects. If the need to help orphans is highly valued but the need to help hospitalized children is perceived as a very different degree and kind of need, one test might be too stringent a measure of generalization for the other. Much of the research in this area has employed measures of donations for different groups of recipients. Children's perceptions of the needs of these different groups and their attitudes toward them may vary greatly. It would be an important research activity to determine children's perceptions of the need of various potential recipients of help, as well as their evaluation of various kinds of helping acts. Then the meaning and comparability of different prosocial acts could be reasonably assessed.

In order to bring about durable and generalized effects

of laboratory analogues of socialization procedure, much more extensive training experiences are needed than those usually employed. Even though long-term effects of relatively brief procedures are sometimes evident, we cannot reasonably expect that an experience lasting 10, 15, or at most 30 minutes will lead to learning that is demonstrated in generalized and enduring behavioral consequences. A few recent studies have attempted to provide children with extensive learning experiences (Yarrow & Scott, 1972; Yarrow, Scott, & Waxler, 1973; Feinberg & Staub, Note 1; Staub & Fotta, Note 2; Staub & Jan-caterino, Note 3); but many more such studies are needed.

Another general issue is the need to develop more measures of prosocial behavior. As has been indicated, an amazing percentage of the research has examined children's donations of candy or tokens or gift certificates to various recipients; the children usually won these in bowling games or as rewards for participation. Furthermore, in a large percentage of the research the effects of modeling and model characteristics on donations were examined, seemingly to the neglect of other questions (see Bryan, 1975). Some research has examined children's reactions to a child in distress (Staub, 1970a, 1970b, 1971a, 1971b, 1971d) or cooperation in laboratory games (reviewed in Bryan, 1975; Staub, 1978b). Varied studies have used as a measure of prosocial behavior the number of objects that children picked up after

an adult "accidentally" dropped them, such as a box of paper clips (Staub, 1971d) or other materials (Green & Schneider, 1974). We need many more meaningful measures of prosocial behavior--some of a laboratory kind, others observational--to evaluate positive behavior in interaction among peers. We have recently attempted to develop some such measures, which include children making toys for hospitalized children and writing letters to them, both intended to evaluate willingness to extend effort in behalf of another (Staub, 1975b). These measures were inspired by, although not taken from, Hartshorne and May's (1929) early research on "service"; their work could be the source of other ideas also. Finally, very little research deals with children's sharing behavior in actual interactions with each other. It is certainly possible to develop procedures to test sharing in the course of ongoing interactions and transactions among children (Staub & Sherk, 1970; Staub, Note 4); it would be important to do so. Much of our prosocial behavior is performed in actual social interactions; we not only donate to charity or to absent persons but also share with persons who are present.

A further important issue for research is the effect of differential treatment as a function of already existing differences among children. The evaluation of children's personalities and their interaction with experimental treatments

has been vastly neglected. Reinforcement for behaving prosocially, the observation of a model, reasoning that promotes kindness, and so forth, are likely to have different effects on children who already vary in personality. We would like to know what personality characteristics can modify the influence of particular efforts at socialization and education in prosocial behavior, and in what ways.

Cognitive developmentalists have been more concerned than experimentalists of the social-learning school with individual differences in children and how they modify the effects of procedures to enhance moral reasoning; but cognitive developmentalists have only concerned themselves with differences along a few dimensions. Cognitive-developmental theory (Kohlberg, 1969, 1976; Piaget, 1932) clearly states that children's cognitive schemes and modes of reasoning will only be affected by experiences and/or information that is not too advanced for their stage of development. Thus the effects of a child's stage of moral reasoning on what he learns from reasoning related to other stages have been explored.

The influence of the level of the child's basic cognitive development on his moral reasoning has also been investigated. Even in this realm, characteristics such as independence/dependency or the need for approval would be useful to consider as influences modifying the child's ability to use information. More generally, prior socialization

experiences are likely to alter the effect of a laboratory procedure on children. For example, a child who is frequently reasoned with and a child who has rarely encountered reasoning by parents will probably respond differently to reasons for particular behavior offered by an experimenter.

In this paper the terms learning and development are used interchangeably. However, developmental approaches to children emphasize the progressive unfolding and intertwining of various characteristics; this process is supposed to occur as the result of maturation and experience. Hoffman (1975b) proposes a theoretical account of the emergence of altruistic motivation to which primitive empathy, object constancy, a sense of identity, and role-taking capacity mutually contribute. The manner in which development and learning combine and modify each other needs to be explored.

PAST RESEARCH, FUTURE RESEARCH, AND APPLICATIONS

The present section describes existing knowledge about influences on prosocial behavior and suggests the kinds of questions that seem important or desirable to explore further. Whenever appropriate, applications of this knowledge to raising children or educating them in prosocial behavior will be considered. I believe that child-rearing practices which contribute to prosocial behavior have generally positive effects: They contribute to self-esteem and a positive

self-concept, the learning of social values and rules of socialized behavior, and a positive orientation toward other people.

The Relationship between Children and Socializers

There is extensive evidence that the relationship between child and socializing agents is extremely important to the development of positive characteristics (e.g., self-confidence, self-esteem, and reasonable rule-following behavior) and prosocial behavior. Two aspects of this relationship stand out: nurturance and affection (in contrast to distance and hostility) and reasonable but effective control over the child (in contrast to permissiveness).

Nurturance and Affection

Research findings have shown that children who interact with a nurturant adult will be, immediately afterwards, more helpful in response to sounds of another child's distress from an adjoining room than will children who interacted with a neutral, matter-of-fact adult (Staub, 1971a; Weissbrod, Note 5). Children who interacted with a warm nurturant adult over a more extensive period of time and in a nursery school setting learned more from instruction and/or from the adult's example than did children exposed to the same training or behavior example by an indifferent and distant adult (Yarrow et al., 1973).

Evidence that the former group learned more was shown by tests at a later time. Perhaps even more importantly, on a task involving figures and objects that can be manipulated to enact various scenes, children who observed an adult enact scenes showing both positive and negative behaviors remembered different things as a function of their relationship to the adult, although all the children learned the same amount from training (Yarrow & Scott, 1972). Children with a fairly long history of nurturant group interaction with the supervisor remembered more of the positive acts; children instructed by a neutral, indifferent adult caretaker remembered more of the negative acts.

These findings strongly suggest the importance of a nurturant, affectionate socializer. The findings are also supported by naturalistic studies that evaluated parental practices in some manner and examined the relationship of these practices to the child's moral values, to peer perception of the child's consideration for others, and to the child's actual prosocial behavior. With some uniformity such research found that parental affection is related to measures of the child's moral values and positive behavior (Hoffman, 1975a; Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967; Mussen, Rutherford, Harris, & Keasey, 1970; Rutherford & Mussen, 1968).

Children who have an affectionate relationship with an adult caretaker may come to feel good about themselves

because they are treated well and do not fear frequent punishment and disapproval; this may result in greater freedom to initiate social behavior, including helpful acts. These children may also identify with the adult to a greater degree: They try to become more like the adult because his characteristics and behavior have acquired value for them.

Children may also learn more from instruction received from such a person. Since anxiety interferes with learning, and children are likely to experience less anxiety in interaction with a nurturant adult, any learning from verbal communications, rewards, and punishments may generally improve if socializers are nurturant. The findings of Yarrow et al. (1973) and of Yarrow and Scott (1972) demonstrate this and suggest the important possibility of selectivity in what children learn. Selectivity may be the result of greater ease in learning when children are exposed to consistent information, which occurs when a nurturant adult teaches positive things or a distant and perhaps rejecting adult teaches negative things. Moreover, if selectivity is a reliable principle of learning, its implications are of extreme importance: The cumulative effects of selective learning over extended periods of time spent with parents or a particular teacher, for example, would be substantial. It is therefore important to replicate the findings of Yarrow and Scott (1972).

More generally, the manner in which different degrees of nurturance, nonnurturance, and hostility result in selectivity in learning is important to explore further. Children might learn some part of the content of what they are taught directly or indirectly (for example, by modeling) but not other parts, or learn different amounts of the material taught. We would be interested in knowing the extent to which context affects the learning of social values and behavior and whether this varies as a function of the length of the child's relationship to the adult. This last point concerning length I will stress repeatedly. A fair amount of the research that I will describe has provided children with only minimal familiarity with an adult. The findings of such research on nurturance and those of Yarrow et al. (1973), who provided children with a much greater degree of familiarity, are consistent so far. But with regard to every influence that we will explore, when the nature of the adult-child relationship is important, its duration is probably also important. It would be desirable to conduct research which varies the length or prior history of interaction. Sometimes the parents or teachers should be trained as the experimenters.

A history of a nurturant, affectionate relationship with important adult socializers may also give children a positive orientation toward other people. They may come to regard the

world as well meaning and trustworthy rather than hostile and malevolent. Although eminently reasonable, this possibility is so far devoid of experimental support. Researchers have not conceptualized individual differences as a dimension of positive-negative orientation toward others, and those few who have made initial attempts in that direction (e.g., Wrightsman, 1966) have studied individual variation in beliefs among adults. Research exploring such basic and gradually developing differences in children's orientations toward others would be useful.

Clearly, I am proposing that differences of this kind probably exist, that they have consequences for prosocial behavior, and that one of the sources of this variation is a history of affectionate, nurturant interaction with adult socializers.

A practical application of these findings would be to teach socializers nurturant, affectionate modes of relating to children. Yarrow et al. (1973) had the same adults supervise small groups of preschool children, on repeated occasions, in either a warm and affectionate or distant and indifferent manner. (The adults were previously trained in these different modes of relating to children.) The success of the training was demonstrated not only by the different behavioral consequences of instruction but also by the observation, coding, and comparison of the caretakers' behavior in

the different groups. The data showed that the caretakers' training was successful; they interacted with children in different experimental groups in different ways. Although the nature and kind of preparation provided to teachers, counselors, and other socializers might have to vary somewhat as a function of existing practices, it should be possible to successfully influence modes of relating to children. Such training could be presented in a manner that is in no way demeaning to the adult, predicated as it is on the basis of our knowledge about the importance of a nurturant relationship with children.

Further research should also explore the meaning and nature of nurturance. So far, researchers have studied the subject as if it were a unitary construct. Most probably this is not so. If nurturance has different dimensions, what are they, and how does each contribute to the tendency to behave prosocially? The differences can be studied by examining the effects of different types of parental nurturance and by creating different types of nurturant environments for children in experimental studies. Nurturance may vary in sensitivity to the child's specific needs and in degree of contingency. Concerning sensitivity, some adults may be warm, affectionate, and rewarding but fail to notice and specifically respond to variations in the child's psychological states; other adults may respond to signs of

distress or varied emotions, eliciting information about the source of unhappiness, providing reassurance, etc. Such variation in sensitivity is likely to contribute to important differences in children, perhaps in their own sensitivity to others. Concerning contingency of nurturance, some adults may use love withdrawal for punishment and control; some may be warm, loving, and affectionate in a noncontingent manner and use practices other than love withdrawal to punish or control. It would be important to explore the consequences of such variations. Hoffman's (1970) research suggests that love withdrawal as a means of discipline may result in relatively rigid adherence to societal standards, without the flexibility that enables children to deviate from them in order to promote another's welfare. Further exploration of the consequences of variation in nurturance along both of these dimensions would be important.

Young children exercise self-constraint and come to follow rules, at least initially, largely because they are so motivated by their relationships to particular individuals. In part they may identify with these individuals and try to become like them (Staub, 1975a, 1978a); in part they try to please them and gain approval. In the process they come to be socialized, to be well-functioning members of their society and, depending on other conditions, prosocial members as well.

Control versus Permissiveness

A group of studies has shown that when a "generous" adult model donated rewards to charity (usually gained by performing well on a bowling game), the children who observed the generous act followed the model's example; they themselves donated more than did children who were not exposed to a generous model. However, when a model had a period of prior nurturant interaction with the child, adherence to standards of generosity set by the model's example was not increased (Rosenhan & White, 1967; Weissbrod, Note 5). In other less directly relevant research, when an adult model employed a fixed standard of self-reinforcement and took a certain number of candies only after a high score on a bowling game, children did not adhere more, or even adhered less, to the high standard set by the model if they experienced a brief period of prior nurturant interaction with the model (Bandura, Grusec, & Menlove, 1967). In contrast, "power" by a model--the communication to children that the adult model, previously unknown, would make an important decision concerning them (e.g., select children for a field trip)--resulted in more charitable donations following the model's example than did exposure to a model without such power (Grusec, 1971).

Children obviously like to maximize their own pleasure, as do adults. When they receive tokens they can exchange for

interesting toys or candy, they are reluctant to part with them. One aspect of learning to be prosocial involves learning that somehow it is worthwhile to do so. When an adult, particularly one whom the children have never seen before and may never see again, is kind and nurturant, this probably implies to the children that they need not worry about punishment from this person. Consequently, they are more likely (a) to feel free to be helpful, as noted before (Staub, 1971a), or (b) to follow their own interests and keep or take material rewards. They may even deviate from social rules to satisfy their own desires or at least adhere less to a standard set by the adult's action that would result in self-deprivation.

An important question to ask is whether these same results would occur when nurturant parents, teachers, or other socializers imply certain standards by their own actions. Given complete permissiveness by an adult, I think the answer is yes. However, with at least minimal application of control to the child and a past history of interaction characterized by both affection and effective control, this is less likely to happen.

To state this more generally, complete permissiveness is not likely to contribute to a child's development of self-control, socialized behavior, moral restraint, and prosocial action that demands self-sacrifice. The child has to

experience some reasonable control from the outside and then gradually develop self-control.

What do I mean by "control"? The concept only minimally refers to the degree to which the child is allowed autonomy (Schaefer, 1959, 1965). Rather, it means that socializers hold some minimal standards as to how the child should behave in interaction with others and in relation to certain values, and that the socializers exert influence to make sure that the child actually behaves according to those standards. Control implies some definite standards, regardless of their nature or extensiveness. Without actually being led to behave according to some standards--and the alternative is complete permissiveness and/or ineffectiveness by socializers--children will not learn from whatever child-rearing practices or modes of instruction parents adopt.

Baumrind (1967, 1971, 1975) found, in a series of naturalistic studies, that children who showed socially responsible behavior in interaction with other children and who also showed competence or achievement orientation in their activity had parents who showed a pattern of behavior which Baumrind called "authoritative." It included reasoning with the child, showing affection, and exercising effective control. I believe that all of these are important, although perhaps not sufficient, for the development of prosocial orientation. In conjunction with these findings it is important

to emphasize that no particular behavior by a socializer will necessarily lead to a specific consequence: The effects of a given practice will depend on the total pattern or combination of practices directed toward the child. Further, the influence of this pattern may also be modified by the child's characteristics.

Clearly, I am suggesting that both nurturance and control are important, in a reasonable combination. The research of Coopersmith (1967) again suggests the importance of both. By various means he measured the self-esteem of a large number of boys and divided them into high-, low-, and medium-self-esteem groups. He reported that parents of boys with high self-esteem showed extensive interest in their children's activities and welfare and were apparently affectionate; but they set clear behavior standards in both social and academic domains and enforced adherence to those standards. Perhaps the standards led children to greater efforts. The standards may also have provided opportunities for them to feel successful and competent and to become self-directive by learning to reward themselves when the standards were met. Beyond demonstrating the significance of control, Coopersmith's findings are relevant to prosocial behavior in another way. Many research studies have shown that specific successes in contrast to failures, the experience of competence in a particular activity, and good experiences of any kind enhance

helpfulness, kindness, and generosity. (For a review, see Rosenhan, Moore, & Underwood, 1976.) These effects are probably achieved in part because they temporarily influence self-esteem and in part for other reasons (Staub, 1975a, 1978b; Note 4). Consequently, long-range individual differences in self-esteem may also affect the willingness or capacity to behave prosocially.

Thus we have some important research questions: Are stable individual differences in children's self-esteem and/or their tendency to feel positively or negatively, to be happy or sad, associated with differences in prosocial behavior? Is the effect of temporary experiences of positive and negative kinds, including success and failure (which apparently affect children's willingness to be helpful), modified by the more stable self-esteem or characteristic mood of children? We can say that if a high positive self-esteem results in generally more prosocial behavior or reduces the effects of negative experiences, the importance of socialization practices that contribute to a positive self-esteem will become even more evident.

Research exploring the manner in which control and nurturance interact and modify other practices is important. Two straightforward research questions, for example, are: How will a child's experience of an adult's nurturance, influence, and reasonable control (so that the child follows

the dictates and standards of the nurturant adult) affect the child's generosity after exposure to the adult's generosity? How will this background affect the child's other prosocial behavior?

Let us assume variation in adults' behavior in both nurturance and control. If the adult did in fact exercise control, nurturance would probably increase adherence to standards implied by the adult's conduct when such adherence demanded self-sacrifice. If the adult did not exercise control, nurturance would probably not increase such adherence. However, control alone (i.e., a history of control and the child's knowledge of future control) without nurturance may cause greater adherence to standards of generosity when the child believes his behavior may become public knowledge. But when the child is certain that others will not learn of his behavior, control alone may not generate this adherence.

An issue related to this last point is both theoretical and methodological. I have implied that children whose behavior is carefully supervised and controlled might come to adopt an adult's standards to gain external reward and avoid external punishment. However, children will be more likely to adopt the adult's standards as their own, and follow them even without the possibility of discovery, when they have a nurturant relationship with an adult. The methodology of much of the laboratory research does not, I believe, allow

us to draw conclusions about such distinctions. In modeling studies, for example, children observe a model and then engage in various activities, including donations, in the same room. Even though they are alone, all the cues surrounding them are the same, and it is questionable that they subjectively feel that their behavior is private. More likely they are concerned to some degree about detection. Testing the child's behavior under different conditions may be mandatory if we are to evaluate the nature of learning that has taken place.

The manner in which control and nurturance separately and together modify the influence of practices other than adults' behavioral example is also important to explore. Do control and nurturance modify the influence of verbal communications about what behavior is desirable? And if so, why? The words of an adult who in past interactions with the child tended to exercise control might be weighed more heavily, might exert more influence, than those of a highly permissive adult. Moreover, nurturance by the controlling adult might contribute to, rather than detract from, the impact of his words. The child might want to be like the nurturant adult, might want to please him, might experience less resentment.

Several further issues are relevant here. First, I will show that participation in prosocial behavior increases the likelihood of further prosocial behavior. Thus the child

with a history of reasonable control that is not resented and that specifically encourages him to behave prosocially is likely to develop prosocial values and a greater tendency to behave prosocially. Any new influence exerted on the child, such as verbal instructions, reinforcement, punishment, or modeling, will therefore have a differential influence as a function of already existing differences.

Second, it is probably important that control be reasonable, that is, of a kind that will avoid long-standing antagonism in the child. One cannot always use the same method to achieve effective control. As Loevinger (1959) in a somewhat facetious article pointed out, children will try to outmaneuver their parents (and adult socializers) and attempt means of subverting specific forms of control. Thus they defend the gratification of their impulses. Parents and socializing agents must be aware of this characteristic of normal children and should be flexible about the specific means of control; they should maintain a belief in both the necessity of some control and the importance of reasonable methods in its exercise. At the extreme, frequent physical punishment has many undesirable consequences and results in aggressive behavior in children (Aronfreed, 1968; Eron, Walder, & Lefkowitz, 1971), probably because they learn to use aggression as a means of resolving conflict and because they generalize to others the hostility and anger aroused by the physical

punishment (Staub, 1975a). It would be desirable to conduct experimental research to show the psychological consequences of different means of control over children. We know from naturalistic studies that reasoning and the use of rewards rather than punishments have positive consequences. But neither parents nor teachers can always reason and reward; sometimes they must use more forceful means, such as deprivation of privileges. Probably this will not have harmful consequences, given an otherwise optimal pattern of parental practices. It would be important to learn the degree to which such means of control are acceptable to the child, that is, do not develop feelings of anxiety, resentment, and hostility that interfere with socialization and contribute to a negative orientation toward people. Once such negative feelings have developed, increasingly more forceful means may become necessary to achieve effective control.

With regard to naturalistic research, it would be useful to differentiate parents according to the relative proportion of power-assertive and punitive modes of discipline in contrast to rewarding modes, and to examine the affective, cognitive, and behavioral correlates of these in the child. This, of course, is a large order. In the laboratory, research could be conducted with children placed in situations in which the opportunity for exercising control over them arises repeatedly. The degree of prior nurturance and the

degree and means of control exercised could be varied. For example, negative control (punishment and withdrawal of privileges) in response to certain behavior could vary markedly. Both the children's feelings toward the adult and the adult's ability to influence their later behavior through reinforcement and modeling could be evaluated to determine the emotional consequences of different types of control. However, ethical considerations and the possibility of harm to children must be carefully weighed; these matters may limit the nature of such research, or even preclude it. Most likely, some questions must be examined in naturalistic research, with careful evaluation of the proportion of negative to positive forms of control in parental behavior, as well as the consequences of that control.

One type of application of these findings, and the reasoning behind them, is in line with my previous suggestion that socializers be trained in nurturant forms of interaction with children. In addition, they should be exposed to the basic philosophy implicit in the previous discussion, a philosophy consistent with the research findings that reasonable, effective, but nonrestrictive control is important; that the control must be flexible in form, adapting to the child's behavior; and that such control, while it can sometimes be forceful, should be minimally forceful and applied in a manner that will not alienate the child. Thus future control

will not become more difficult, and the emotional orientation of the child will not be affected negatively. Probably this philosophy will only be put into practice if socializing agents also learn variable means of control, developing appropriate skills in guiding children.

Techniques of Teaching, Guiding, and Educating Children
and Influencing Their Development

Conditioning Procedures

Clearly, reward and punishment are likely to affect children's prosocial behavior. However, we are less concerned with whether expectations of rewards and punishments will maintain prosocial behavior than with the major issue of how the motivation to behave prosocially develops. Prosocial behavior motivated by self-gain, whether material or social (e.g., praise), contributes greatly to a harmonious society. However, the motivation to benefit other people is likely to lead to prosocial behavior of much greater generality. Such motivation implies that people have learned to guide themselves to behave prosocially, providing appropriate self-rewards and self-punishments. We now need to examine the circumstances under which external reinforcement for prosocial behavior and punishment for lack of it contribute to the development of such motivation.

Only external rewards and punishments that are provided in certain ways and under certain conditions are likely to

promote values, beliefs, and emotional reactions leading to the desire to help others. Cognitive-dissonance theory and its application to moral development (Festinger & Freedman, 1964), as well as self-perception theory (Bem, 1972), directly suggest or imply that only when external force is weak, leading to behavior change that is felt to be self-caused rather than caused by compliance with external pressure, will a person's values and associated future behavior be affected. Research that has explored the effect of conditioning practices on prosocial behavior has not established what conditions will lead to such self-attribution and changes in self-perception, in contrast to children attributing their behavior to the pressure exerted by external reward and punishment.

I am implying that the effects of conditioning procedures can be accounted for in cognitive terms. If we are to gain understanding of the contribution of conditioning to the development of prosocial behavior, we must be concerned with cognitive as well as affective mediation. As Bandura's (1971) review of findings of aversive and other types of conditioning shows, expectations of reinforcement determine responses. For example, after conditioning that involved the pairing of a light with a shock, the expectation of shock following the light determines whether persons will show conditioned physiological reactions. This is strongly indicated

by the finding that when the shock electrodes are removed, response to the light practically disappears; that is, when people know that no more shock can follow, conditioned reactions disappear. In research that employs conditioning procedures, investigators should determine the cognitive as well as behavioral consequences of their procedures. They should ask what conditions can be created to produce expectations of reward for behaving prosocially and punishment for not doing so; what conditions create widely generalized expectations rather than highly specific ones; and what conditions lead to self-attribution, changed perception of self, and changed values and beliefs.

The experiments conducted in this domain explored how rewards, punishments, and procedures that attempted to create classical conditioning experiences affect subsequent prosocial behavior (Fischer, 1963; Gelfand, Hartmann, Cromer, Smith, & Page, 1975; Midlarsky & Bryan, 1967; Aronfreed & Paskal, Notes 6, 7; Hartmann, Gelfand, Smith, Paul, Cromer, & Lebenta, Note 8). Several findings have significance for both future research and application. First, in order for children to learn from a particular stimulus-response-reinforcement sequence--that is, to learn that they will be rewarded if they share with another child (Gelfand et al., 1975) or will be aversively reinforced by having rewards withheld if they do not share (Hartmann et al., Note 8)--

the contingency must be verbally communicated to them. Both preschool and young elementary school children have difficulty in figuring out on their own what is actually happening. Talking to children, explaining to them the consequences of their behavior, seems to be an important requirement for effective instrumental conditioning.

Second, in research conducted by Gelfand, Hartmann, and their associates, who separately examined each child's response to particular reinforcement contingencies, the tremendous individual differences in children's reactions to experimental treatments were almost as impressive as the substantive findings. Some children who were told about the relationship between their behavior and certain consequences immediately engaged in sharing behavior; consequently, in the aversive-conditioning procedure some children never experienced negative consequences. Other children shared their rewards even before such communications; thus they had to be excluded from the remaining parts of the procedure, since they could not be conditioned. Still others responded only if rewards or aversive consequences were repeated.

If we are to understand the development of positive behavior as well as other social characteristics, we must concern ourselves with the characteristics of the children that result in such differential responsiveness to verbal communications and/or actual conditioning. One source of the

difference might be already existing values about helpfulness and the desire to share. Another might be sensitivity to social expectations; children who are better in reading social expectations and/or are more sensitive to them cooperate to a greater degree. Still another difference might be the degree to which the children previously had control exercised over them in everyday life, causing some variation in their trust of verbal communications indicating that rewards or punishments will follow particular actions. Those who had learned that consequences follow statements by parents or teachers would respond to simply verbal communications about the contingency, while others might have to experience the contingency. Finally, some children may have learned to respond negatively to social pressure such as the promise of reward or threat of punishment. This may explain the behavior of children who continued to miss rewards by not sharing (although they were few in number). Issues of intelligence also enter in. Fischer (1963) found a substantial correlation between IQ and his criterion of acquisition of sharing. The clearer the contingencies, the less influential was IQ in determining response to rewards and punishments.

It is also important to note that differences exist in children's persistence in sharing. After children were told that they would be fined for not sharing, those who started to share immediately, and continued to share on each trial,

and thus were never fined, persisted most in their sharing behavior during extinction trials (after being told that no more fines would follow) (Hartmann et al., Note 8). The above explanation of individual differences in response to the treatments might also be applicable to differences in the persistence of sharing.

Several experiments attempted to show that classical conditioning procedures will increase prosocial behavior. Aronfreed and Paskal (Note 6) and Midlarsky and Bryan (1967) found that the appearance of a light followed by a hug paired with sounds of joy from the experimenter encouraged children to action that produced the light rather than action that produced a piece of candy. However, children sacrificed the candy only when the appearance of the light continued to result in the experimenter's response. Moreover, Midlarsky and Bryan found that a backward conditioning procedure, in which the children received a hug and experienced expressions of joy before the light appeared, was as successful as the regular conditioning sequence. Such procedures usually have only slight effects or none at all. Since empathic reactions, which according to Aronfreed and Paskal mediated the children's response, were not measured, possibly the children's evaluation of the situation--their cognitive rather than affective reactions--determined their behavior. The same reasoning may apply to a more complicated experiment

by Aronfreed and Paskal (Note 7) which tried to demonstrate that helping someone in distress is the result of learning both sympathetic reactions (which follow from pairing one's own feelings with those of others) and an instrumental response to alleviate another's distress. Their complicated experimental procedure was more effective than several control procedures in leading children to respond to another's apparent distress, but it was not clearly established what the children learned. It remains an open question whether empathic or sympathetic emotional reactions were actually produced by these methods.

As I will discuss later, it seems highly important to develop measures of empathic reactions which show the degree to which children actually experience emotion. More generally, it is apparent that the cognitive and affective consequence of experimental procedures, which in turn may mediate behavior, would be important to evaluate. One possible method of doing this is to include two groups that receive identical experimental treatments. With one group the dependent measures would be cognitive and affective reactions. With another group, they would be behavioral responses. Two identical groups are necessary because the measurement of cognitive and affective reactions to experimental treatments would probably affect behavioral reactions. If behavioral reactions are measured first, they in turn are likely to

shape cognitive and emotional responses. The time and effort required by such a methodology might be substantially repaid by our increased ability to explain the reasons for the behavioral consequences, that is, the cognitive and emotional reactions that mediated them.

Modeling

Experiments have shown in a number of domains that modeling, the behavioral example of other people, often affects the behavior of observers. This is also true in the area of prosocial behavior. Most of these experiments show that immediately after exposure to a prosocial model both children and adults will attempt to help others in distress or need (Bryan & Test, 1967; Staub, 1971a; Wheeler & Wagner, Note 9); or they will donate to needy children, to various kinds of charities, or to peers who otherwise would not get rewards (Bryan & Walbek, 1970a, 1970b; Harris, 1970, 1972; Macauley, 1970; Rosenhan & White, 1967; for reviews, see Bryan, 1975; Staub, 1975a, 1978b). A number of these studies also showed that exposure to a selfish model decreases generosity. When certain consequences follow modeling (e.g., the expression of positive affect by the model about having donated), the model's influence is enhanced (Midlarsky & Bryan, 1972). Although the research clearly shows that exposure to modeling affects a person's immediate psychological condition and resulting behavior, it provides little information about

long-term consequences.

However, everything that we know--our theories, such as the theory of identification-internalization (Staub, 1975a, 1978a) as well as our empirical knowledge--suggests that imitation is extremely important to the development of children's personality and behavioral dispositions. Research findings on delay of gratification (Bandura & Mischel, 1965; Staub, 1972a) and other domains (Hicks, 1965) and one study in the domain of prosocial behavior (Rushton, 1975) have demonstrated that even limited exposure to generous and stingy models respectively increased and decreased children's donations both immediately after the training experience and 2 months later. (Even though some modification in procedure occurred, the testing circumstances were basically the same as those of the training.) Possibly the extent to which the children's behavior was originally affected by perceived social expectations for donating a certain amount caused continuation of those expectations. On the other hand, the children might have established a certain standard for themselves by their original donations, and they later adhered to these standards. In further research we need to provide children with modeling experiences more extensive than those in the usual laboratory study, so that we can reasonably expect generalized and durable behavioral changes resulting from the treatment. And of course we need to test such

changes. Finally, it is time to attempt to evaluate the cognitive and affective consequences of such modeling procedures, so that we will have a clearer conception of how the behavioral effects are mediated. In the following, one aspect of mediation will be examined, together with the research that it implies.

In everyday life will a model's behavior always increase prosocial behavior? Probably not. Some research findings with adults indicate, in my view, that the motives attributed to a model determine whether people will follow the model's example in acting prosocially (Hornstein, 1970). Hornstein had each subject "find" a wallet on the street. Inside each wallet was a note indicating that the wallet had, in fact, been found by the note writer, who intended to return it to the original owner. Presumably the wallet had then been lost again. Various kinds of information were included in the notes. In one, the model wrote that he experienced social pressure to return the wallet; in another, that returning the wallet would be acting contrary to suggestions that he keep it. When the note seemed to imply a strong personal commitment to returning the wallet (that is, a prosocial motive or intention) or when the note included no information about the model's motive, the experimental subjects frequently tended to return the wallet. Any information in the note implying that the original finder's

motives were less prosocial (e.g., outside pressure to return the wallet) tended to reduce subjects' return rates. These and other considerations (Staub, 1978b) suggest the possibility that the effect of modeling is a function of motives attributed to the model. This may be true with regard to both the immediate and long-term influence of modeling. When motives appear positive and unselfish, and/or circumstances lead observers to draw those conclusions, observers may be inspired by the model's prosocial example and may follow it. Of course, other circumstances that can be expected to modify a model's influence, such as nurturance and prior control, presumably remain influential. They may themselves affect attributions of intentions to the model.

A variety of research questions follows. Will the degree to which generosity (or selfishness) is imitated be affected by (a) explicit information about different motives of different individuals, and (b) knowledge of different individuals' characteristics gained from certain of their actions (knowledge that allows conclusions about the kind of people they are)? Probably the generosity of an unkind person has little effect on observers most of the time because selfish motives are attributed to the model. (The selfishness of an unkind person, however, may enhance generosity because people may want to contrast their own behavior to it.)

We would want to discover the particular characteristics of adults (their behavior and style) whose actions give rise to attributions of positive motives. Still another research question is whether the observation of a prosocial model who acts kindly toward another person has different effects on observers, depending on whether the recipient of kindness has the power to substantially benefit the model in return. The model's behavior, in this case, may suggest selfish motives, the desire to induce reciprocity in the recipient (Schopler, 1970; Staub, 1972b). Lastly, the personality of the observer may affect whether he will attribute positive or negative motives to other people. Such personality differences probably develop gradually with age as the tendency to infer motives, values, and internal states of others increases (Shantz, 1975; Staub, 1978a). The attribution of positive or negative intentions to others may modify the influence of exposure to a prosocial example. We would want to know which characteristics of the observer predict his inferences about the motives of the model. Answers to these research questions and the clarification of the underlying issues are highly important. Differences in morally relevant characteristics and in the perceived motives of socializers may have an important effect on children's reactions not only to the socializer's behavioral examples but also to the varied disciplinary and educational practices they use. As a

result, what children learn from their socializers may often be different from what the socializers intend to teach.

We have some evidence, in fact, that certain prior actions of adults can diminish their influence. Although Bryan and Walbek (1970a, 1970b) found no evidence that a discrepancy between adults' degree of generosity and verbal advocacy of generosity affected children's imitation of the adults' actions, it was found by Midlarsky, Bryan, and Brickman (1973) that hypocritical behavior affected adults' capacity to reinforce children's generosity. Children reinforced for donations by an adult who had previously served as a non-hypocritical model showed an increase in donating behavior. Those reinforced by a previously hypocritical model showed progressive decrease in donations.

The kind of research questions suggested with regard to imitation should also be applied to other areas. The success of reinforcement and of other practices, such as reasoning and focusing responsibility on children, may be diminished or enhanced by the manner in which children perceive and evaluate their socializers. Rebelliousness may result from the perception of hostility or the attribution of negative motives.

These considerations suggest, further, that certain basic values orientations in socializers may be important in developing a prosocial orientation in children. It is likely that

basic values orientations gain expression in an affectionate relationship with a child and in other practices that were found to contribute to the development of prosocial behavior. In addition, parents or other socializers whose activities consistently reflect a prosocial orientation might be evaluated in a manner that enhances their effectiveness in modeling or in reinforcing prosocial behavior. In contrast, socializers with another values orientation may have less potency in guiding children toward prosocial conduct. Hypocrisy as well as inconsistency between verbally expressed values and behavior may cause problems. Rosenhan (1970) interpreted some research findings from a correlational interview study in this manner. He suggested that subjects who were only marginally involved in civil rights activities had parents who verbally expressed prosocial values and, at least early in life, were nurturant with their children. However, the parents' failure to live what they taught resulted in a "crisis of hypocrisy." This was not the case with more committed civil rights activists, whose parents expressed their own values in action.

Induction and Reasoning by Parents

Researchers and commentators concerned with the field of moral development have long stressed, as an important antecedent of moral development, the significance of parental reasoning and other kinds of verbal interaction with children

(Baumrind, 1967, 1971; Hoffman, 1970; Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957). Hoffman (1970) emphasized the importance of induction (that is, pointing out to children the consequences of their behavior on others) as a major contributor to moral values and conduct. Naturalistic research has tended to bear out Hoffman's point (Hoffman, 1975a; Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967; Mussen et al., 1970), suggesting that parental reasoning contributes to the development of moral values, peer perception of children's helpfulness or consideration for others, and other positive characteristics.

In contrast, experimental research has had often meager and sometimes conflicting results. Early research on "positive" induction (that is, pointing out the positive consequences of helpful behavior) was unsuccessful in increasing preschool prosocial behavior (Staub, 1971d). Many other kinds of verbal communications have been employed by experimenters and models in conjunction with their behavioral example. The following conclusions seem to be warranted (Staub, 1978a, 1978b): When a communication to a child clearly states that he is expected to share with or donate to other children, and the amount and manner of compliance are specified, there is general adherence to the communication (Grusec, 1972; Grusec & Skubiski, 1972). The donations are greater than those of children in control groups and similar to those of groups exposed to donating models.

In contrast, general statements about the desirability of donating to others (or about the advantages of selfishness) have no effect on children's donations (Bryan & Walbek, 1970a, 1970b), although in one study verbal communications advocating selfishness decreased donations on a delayed post-test (Rushton, 1975). Simply telling children that it is "good" to share or verbally advocating prosocial behavior in other nonspecific ways apparently has little beneficial effect. In everyday life children may observe that such communications are often unenforced; they may come to ignore them, or at least their actions may remain unaffected. This general finding, which will be buttressed by other findings below, has implications for any attempts at educating children in prosocial behavior. Preaching is likely to be useless.

There are two important differences between such verbalizations and those employed by parents tested in naturalistic studies: First, as I earlier emphasized, the pattern of parental practices is probably significant. Parents who use induction are likely to use other associated practices; the combination may contribute to moral development. Unfortunately, the relationships among various practices is not well known (but see Baumrind, 1971). Second, parents have long-term relationships to their children; they have exercised past control, and they can exert influence in the future.

To a child, the meaning of induction or verbal communication by parents may be different from such a communication by a stranger, never seen before and never to be seen again. For children in experimental studies to take induction seriously and to learn from it, the prerequisites may be a past history of control, or the awareness of future supervision by an adult, or actual participation in prosocial behavior (often the result of control by adults).

This reasoning has led to several experiments, with complex results.¹ Staub and Fotta (Note 2) had children participate in four 40-minute experimental training sessions and then evaluated their prosocial behavior. Girls who made puzzles for hospitalized children in these sessions (i.e., participated in prosocial behavior) and had the positive consequences of their behavior progressively pointed out to them subsequently behaved more prosocially than did girls who (a) only participated in prosocial behavior, (b) engaged in a neutral activity and experienced induction, or (c) neither participated in prosocial behavior nor experienced induction. Induction in any form had no effect on boys, while participation in prosocial behavior somewhat increased boys'

¹The experiments by Staub & Fotta; Staub, Leary, & Short-sleeves; and Staub & Jancaterino that are discussed below are described in two published sources: Staub, 1975b, and Staub, 1978a.

prosocial intentions. In another study (Feinberg & Staub, Note 1), induction combined with participation in prosocial action again increased the subsequent prosocial behavior of girls (e.g., making toys for hospitalized children) but not of boys. Interestingly, induction appeared to reduce boys' prosocial behavior immediately following the training experience, while slightly increasing it on a delayed posttest. Boys who, during the training, engaged in a prosocial behavior that was not obviously "good" conduct (e.g., making toys to help an art teacher rather than for hospitalized children) showed the greatest increase in prosocial behavior and acted about as prosocially as the most prosocial girls. The evidence suggests that the various forms of verbal communications attempting to persuade boys to behave prosocially have little effect, and sometimes a negative effect (Bernstein, 1975; Grusec & Skubiski, 1970; Feinberg & Staub, Note 1; Staub & Fotta, Note 2). These findings are consistent with research findings in other domains which show that while girls are affected by verbal communications, the attitudes and behavior of boys are unaffected (Hovland & Janis, 1959; Staub, 1972a). An exception in the area of prosocial behavior seems to be verbal communications that specify a behavioral rule (e.g., prescription of donations by children; Grusec, 1972). That specification of a behavioral rule results in both immediate and later increases in prosocial

behavior has also been found in other studies (see below) which attempted to explore somewhat different questions (White, 1972; White & Burnam, 1975; Dressel & Midlarsky, Note 1).

Important questions follow: A basic one is the manner in which reasoning and induction with children, in the framework of a long-lasting relationship, affects prosocial behavior as well as the development of children's values and their evaluations of other persons' needs. Will an adult who has a relatively extensive history of nurturant interactions with a child and has exercised control over him be capable of affecting the child's thinking and behavior by reasoning and induction? The question, of course, implies the exploration of differences in the effects of reasoning and induction as a function of extensive variation in previous nurturance and control.

Several additional conditions may affect the child's response to verbal communications that indicate the desirability of positive behavior. First, the manner of reasoning must be appropriate for the child's age and cognitive capacities. The evaluation of the child's ability to understand particular reasoning might therefore be useful. Second, children's past experience with reasoning by their socializing agents may affect their responsiveness to reasoning within an experiment or in everyday life. Children accustomed to power-

assertive discipline may need some special instruction to respond to this new mode of influence. Third, children may respond to certain kinds of influence with psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966), expressed in oppositional behavior; in addition, substantial individual differences may develop in this oppositional tendency. In at least one study, induction decreased children's helpfulness on one measure, perhaps as a result of such opposition (Staub, 1971d). This phenomenon may also explain the negative effect on boys of some verbal communications (Bernstein, 1975; Feinberg & Staub, Note 1). The findings of Feinberg and Staub indicated that boys exposed to induction engaged in substantially less prosocial behavior immediately after training than on a delayed post-test; it would be interesting to explore the possibility that reasoning and induction might lead to opposition in boys but nonetheless result in learning. With the passage of some time after exposure to reasoning, psychological reactance may dissipate, and boys' prosocial behavior may show an increase.

When an influence attempt is highly indirect and not perceived as a force, children are not expected to react with opposition. When the influence is clear and straightforward, such as an explicit behavioral rule, opposition is aroused to a lesser degree. When, however, in a seemingly free situation some force or pressure is brought to bear, opposition

may be greater. Individual differences in the tendency to react with opposition may be an important basic determinant of what children learn from various socializing practices. The development of a measure for this purpose would be a useful contribution to understanding socialization.

Finally, children's own participation in considering reasons for behaving prosocially may be important if reasoning is to be effective. Cognitive developmentalists have conducted experiments to advance moral judgment by exposing children to examples of moral reasoning more advanced than their own. The experimenters have induced the children to discuss conflicts among different ways of reasoning about moral dilemmas and helped them resolve these conflicts (Blatt & Kohlberg, in press). Although Blatt and Kohlberg conceived of such a procedure as simply stimulating children's thinking, it seems to have an instructive, educational component: it involves the children in reasoning. Participation in developing a position in favor of a particular attitude has long been found more effective in changing attitudes than merely providing people with arguments.

Similar procedures, applied to the formation of children's thinking about the needs or welfare of other human beings and the importance of helpful action, may prove to be more effective than the one-way communications characteristic of most past research.

Participation in Prosocial Behavior

I mentioned earlier that when a rule concerning generosity was laid down for children, they tended to follow the rule and donated more than did children in control groups and at least as much as did children exposed to generous models (Grusec, 1972; White & Burnam, 1975; Dressel & Midlarsky, Note 10). Leading children to "rehearse" prosocial behavior (i.e., donate in the presence of an adult) also resulted in greater subsequent donations (White, 1972; White & Burnam, 1975). The children were usually led to rehearse the behavior by being told to follow a rule to donate. Previous performance of prosocial behavior also increased the prosocial behavior of these children on delayed posttests (compared with control subjects). Performing a prosocial act may set a standard for later prosocial behavior and/or may affect children's thinking about being helpful as well as their perceptions of themselves as helpful. In research with adults, performance of one prosocial act was found to increase the likelihood of performance of another (Harris, 1972).

I have suggested that focusing responsibility on children to behave prosocially and actually influencing them to engage in prosocial behavior may be important ways to teach children prosocial conduct (Staub, 1975a, 1975b, 1978a; Feinberg & Staub, Note 1). In some of the cultures that Whiting and Whiting (Note 11) studied in which children tended to be

altruistic rather than egotistic, the children had regular household duties. I refer to this as structured responsibility assignment. When, however, children are influenced to behave prosocially in the flow of everyday events, the responsibility assignment is unstructured. It is not the assignment of responsibility, of course, that is primarily important; rather the key is actually inducing children to behave prosocially, to participate in prosocial action. When the manner in which children are induced to do this leads them to assume responsibility for their prosocial actions, participation may be particularly effective in leading to later prosocial behavior. A precondition for this may be not to exert too great a force on them.

I would like to consider three different types of participation: (a) children are asked or directed to do certain things (the concept of responsibility assignment refers to this kind of participation); (b) role playing (which may be regarded as an "as if" participation); and (c) prosocial behavior that is perceived as a privilege and is thus emotionally reinforcing (this participation is a form of interactive life experience).

The issue of participation is relevant to the notion of learning through experience. Cognitive developmentalists have long proposed that the moral development of children is not a function of educative influences directed toward them

at home and in schools but of their experiences in interaction with others, particularly experiences that involve role taking in interaction with peers (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932). The home and school can limit or expand the opportunities for such experience. Unfortunately, the dimensions of experiences that could be important have never been carefully analyzed, and certainly not empirically examined. At the same time, the notion of experience in interaction with other people as the source of development is extremely important, from a cognitive developmental perspective and from any position that seriously concerns itself with the child's growth and development. Presumably, the different types of experiences modify each other's influence. Children's experiences with parents and other socializers from an early age on are likely to influence their personalities and to affect what they learn from interaction with peers, even under seemingly identical circumstances. This again points to the importance of examining children's personality characteristics and considering how children with different characteristics are affected by the same opportunities for experiential learning.

Assignment of responsibility as participation. The most evidence we have about the influence of prosocial-behavior participation on later prosocial behavior--even though that evidence was collected to examine other hypotheses--concerns

responsibility assignment. Responsibility assignment may lead to awareness of the desirability of the behavior in question, with associated reward contingencies. Under certain conditions internalization may take place, the child learning to evaluate positively an action that brings about improvement in another person's welfare and to reward himself for behavior which has that effect. One way for such internalization to take place is to provide children with cognitions (beliefs, value statements, etc.) promoting prosocial behavior and opportunities for an association to develop between their own behavior and these cognitions.

Stating a behavioral rule--for example, a clear-cut expectation that children will donate--can be regarded as a form of responsibility assignment; it increases prosocial behavior even more than does modeling (White, 1972; White & Burnam, 1975) or other procedures. Having children participate in making toys for hospitalized children is also a form of responsibility assignment. In one study, subjects' performance of prosocial behavior in two approximately 45-minute time periods also increased their later prosocial behavior (Feinberg & Staub, Note 1), although the content of the activity made a difference: Participation in one type of prosocial activity had a greater effect on boys; in another type, on girls. Being an older sibling or having important duties in the maintenance of the family were associated,

respectively, with responding more to sounds of another child's distress (Staub, 1970b, 1971a, 1971d) and with being generally more helpful (Whiting & Whiting, Note 11)--both results presumably being the consequence of more experience with responsible action.

In all the experimental studies I have referred to, children were simply asked to engage in particular prosocial activities, which they did without objection. Responsibility was assigned to them, but painlessly.

The assignment of responsibility can be mild, straightforward, and matter-of-fact. Responsibilities can often be part of the regular life activities of the child such as taking care of younger siblings or a pet, or some aspect of home maintenance, so that the child contributes to the welfare of the family. (The little research evidence we have suggests that if such home responsibilities are trivial in nature or too extensive in comparison with others in the culture, there will be no positive, and perhaps negative, consequences. See Bossard & Boll, 1956; Whiting & Whiting, Note 11). Naturally, however, within families and other socialization settings there can be initial difficulties in persuading the child to accept responsibilities that demand effort and self-sacrifice for the benefit of others. Under what conditions must one exert force, and under what conditions is force unnecessary? If children are coerced into engaging in prosocial

activities, will they have a continued sense that their behavior is externally caused? Or will the behavior be perceived as self-directed? Insistence that a child assume structured responsibilities or follow rules that prescribe prosocial action in interaction with others may lead over time to regular, naturally occurring prosocial behavior; this prosocial behavior is then perceived as self-caused and may lead, under the proper circumstances, to the development of beliefs and values consistent with the behavior.

The above discussion clearly implies a variety of research questions: First, does assignment of responsibility and the resulting participation in prosocial behavior enhance later prosocial behavior and contribute to a prosocial orientation?

Second, what is the effect of the specific content of the activity? If children have strong feelings (inclination or aversion) about different types of behavior, the content of the behavior may be highly important. For example, boys from second to sixth grade have a very low base rate of writing letters to hospitalized children when they have the opportunity to voluntarily decide to do so. They may also perceive activities of certain kinds, or those presented to them in certain ways, as "goody-goody" and consequently may react negatively to pressure to engage in them. Girls may have other preferences and aversions. These must be considered

when participation in such activities is for the purpose of either training or testing the effects of training.

Third, what is the effect of participation when force is exerted in varying degrees to bring it about? I would hypothesize that this depends partly on the length of time that children subsequently engage in the activity and partly on whether force is continuously exerted. Let us consider a child who is induced with a fair amount of pressure to engage in a prosocial behavior--regular clean-up of the yard of a poor, elderly neighbor. If the child continues to do this over a long period of time and circumstances are such that no further pressure is necessary for the later performance of the activity, it should contribute to the child's subsequent prosocial behavior. However, force that leads the child to behave prosocially on a single occasion is less likely to have beneficial effects. My example immediately points to another issue: Certain activities may become automatic more easily than others, so that they are performed without additional pressure at later times. The extent to which a required prosocial act deviates from what other children in the same culture are asked to do may also modify its influence. Finally, discussion and consideration of the reasons for acting prosocially seem to have an important influence, at the intuitive level, on both boys and girls. Although some laboratory research shows that verbal induction

with boys may be not only ineffective but sometimes counter-productive, naturalistic research shows a positive association between induction and positive behavior. When research findings are at odds with each other and with intuition, what does one do? Hopefully, one performs more research. If boys have engaged in prosocial behavior for some time as a result of responsibility assignment, verbal consideration of the reasons for the prosocial behavior may beneficially affect their later prosocial behavior and/or orientation.

Role playing as participation. I have proposed that role playing is a form of participation, an "as if" participation. Whether or not role playing is regarded as such, it seems to have value. Experimental findings suggest that role playing may be an effective means of training children in prosocial behavior or of contributing to their prosocial orientation. In one study, pairs of children enacted the role of helper and person in need of help. The children then exchanged roles. They showed more prosocial behavior on both immediate and delayed posttests than did control subjects. The role playing had both specific and generalized effects (Staub, 1971d). Another study provided young adolescent juvenile delinquents with extensive role-playing experience (Chandler, 1973). They created, enacted, and filmed scenes based on their life experiences, with each participant enacting each role in each scene. Their role-taking capacity was measured,

before and after training. Following training they showed substantial increase compared with their earlier performance and with control groups. Participants in this training engaged in fewer illegal activities over an 18-month period subsequent to the experience than did control subjects. In still another study, the exposure of children to prosocial television affected their subsequent prosocial behavior only when it was followed by role-playing prosocial behavior (Friedrich & Stein, 1973). Other types of activities following exposure, such as labeling television content, did not have comparable effect.

Role playing probably has several consequences. First, it can lead to learning specific prosocial acts. Second, it can lead to prosocial strategies in interacting with other people. Plans, strategies, and cognitive competencies in how to relate positively to other people may be important precursors of prosocial behavior. Behavior competencies are probably also necessary for overt prosocial acts to occur. In addition to contributing to such learning, role playing may have psychological consequences similar to those of participation in real prosocial behavior: Children may come to perceive the positive role-playing acts they perform as part of themselves; they may derive standards of conduct from these acts or accept the implied standards. Finally, role playing can contribute to the capacity to view events from the

perspectives of others. This in turn is likely to be an important condition for the activation of prosocial values and empathic reactions.

There is some evidence, in fact, of a direct relationship between role-taking capacity and prosocial behavior (Rubin & Schneider, 1973). Role taking has also been found to relate to, and may even be a precondition for, the development of moral judgment (Selman, 1971). In turn, moral judgment has been found to relate to prosocial action (Rubin & Schneider, 1973). Although the terms role taking and empathy are used interchangeably by a few investigators, others consider role taking a precondition for vicarious (empathic) emotional reactions. Evidence is sparse about the relationship between the two. It is possible that, as Hoffman (1975b) suggests, role taking amplifies primitive empathic affect.

The exploration of the relationship among role taking, empathy, and prosocial behavior would be of great value. Here one must start with the understanding that role taking is not a unitary construct; there are different kinds of role taking which are, at most, only moderately related to each other (Shantz, 1975; Staub, 1978a). Furthermore, one cannot expect that greater role-taking capacity will necessarily be associated with greater prosocial behavior. The ability to view events from another's perspective, to anticipate how some experience can cause suffering, may lead to feelings of

satisfaction by an antisocial person or a person who hates the sufferer. We need to know whether role taking combined with prosocial values (or, more accurately, role taking combined with prosocial values activated by another's suffering or need) increases prosocial behavior. How related are role-taking capacity and prosocial values? Some relationship may in fact exist, as it does between role taking and moral reasoning (Selman, 1971). But certainly not everybody with advanced role-taking skills has a strong prosocial orientation or shows advanced moral reasoning. Further, what is the relationship between role taking skills and the experience of empathy in response to others' needs? Again, some relationship may exist, but certainly not everybody who can see an event from another's perspective reacts empathically. What other characteristics are involved in the association, or lack of it? Perhaps these characteristics are personal values, which determine the interpretation applied to another's experience. The exploration of such questions may result in a substantial contribution to our knowledge.

Hoffman (1975b) presented a model which implies that while empathy is independent of role taking, role taking can enlarge, modify, and change the nature of empathy. Is this the case? A basic task for future research is to develop a valid measure of empathy that offers evidence of children's affective involvement rather than the purely verbal statement

provided by current measures (Feshbach & Roe, 1968). Then the interrelationship among such affective responsiveness, role taking, and prosocial values and behavior can be reliably explored.

From a theoretical perspective it would be extremely valuable to examine what is learned in role playing and what consequences of role playing, assuming there are several, contribute to prosocial behavior. Role-taking measures could be used; tests of competencies in certain types of prosocial behavior could be developed (e.g., children who had role-played responses to another child's psychological distress could be asked to demonstrate desirable responses to particular forms of distress); and other measures could be devised to evaluate the extent to which different types of consequences actually occur. Whether they do occur is likely to be a function of the type of role playing employed.

There are many dimensions along which role playing can vary. First is the dimension of initiative and creative involvement required of children. Role playing can be based on prepared scripts, so that children act as in a play; or participants themselves can develop the roles to be played, either freely or on the basis of suggested content areas. The age of the children, their cognitive maturity, and the exact purpose of the role playing (education or research) might determine what procedure to select in this regard.

Role playing can also vary in the extent to which it focuses on (a) specific prosocial behaviors (and thereby contributes to behavioral competencies), or (b) outcomes or goals (and thereby concentrates on both the motivation for action and the strategies that must be developed to accomplish the goals). Further, different participants may successively assume the same role and shift back and forth between roles; these and other strategies can enhance role taking.

The development of procedures to embody such variations can be useful in employing role-playing strategies to enhance prosocial behavior and to conduct research; the procedures and related research help us to assess the connection between the nature of role playing and what is learned from it, and to evaluate the consequences on the personality and behavior of the child.

Indirect learning and participation in interactive experiences. I would like finally to focus on another type of "participation." In school systems across the country, children have been employed as tutors for other children (Lippitt, 1968; Thelen, 1969). Recently we have examined, in laboratory investigations, what happens when children are asked to teach other children (Staub, 1978a; Staub & Jancat-erino, Note 3; Staub, Leavy, & Shortsleeves, Note 12). Children teaching other children either a prosocial or neutral activity enhances later prosocial behavior of the children-

teachers. An accidental finding of a training procedure was that children who acted as confederates of the experimenter in providing a stimulus for help for other children were later more helpful than actual experimental subjects or control children (Staub & Buswell, Note 13).

Collaborating with socializing agents, particularly in activities that seem important or prestigious (e.g., the role of teacher or tutor), is likely to be a positive experience for many children. They may regard these responsibilities as a privilege rather than an onerous duty. The satisfactions that children experience as a result of their role, the attendant activities, and the connection to the adult are associated with benefiting another person and assuming some responsibility for his welfare.

There is, then, an association between a satisfying experience and a meaningful interactive prosocial activity. A special characteristic of such a procedure is that the tutor, who is the main object of interest, is not the direct object of the instruction, in contrast to most of the procedures previously discussed. This special characteristic may minimize or avoid arousal of psychological reactance and thus may constitute a highly effective form of instruction. Teaching is participation in a meaningful social-interactive experience that provides opportunities for role taking and, in

fact, demands that children engage in role taking if they are to be successful in the teacher role.

This is a largely unexplored area in which many problems need to be researched. First, the basic phenomenon must be further confirmed: i.e., that the experience of teaching others affects later prosocial behavior. Second, the influence of the content taught, although already somewhat explored (Staub, 1975b; Staub & Feinberg, Note 1; Staub et al., Note 14), must be further investigated. We also want to know whether teaching that is more beneficial to the pupil will have greater effect on teachers. Third, we should know more about the length of time a child engages in teaching others and the amount of that teaching; both may be important. Fourth, the competency of the teacher is probably of substantial importance. When teachers struggle with the material or lack the proper teaching skills, they are likely to have a frustrating rather than a satisfying experience.

The child's feeling of competency can be enhanced in several ways. Careful selection of subject matter is probably important. The effectiveness of the entire procedure may be substantially enhanced by instruction in both content area and teaching methods (e.g., how to give instructions, how to reinforce pupil progress, how to decide how much the pupil understands). For several reasons, the proper selection

of children to be taught may also be a significant determinant of success; preferably they should be younger and less academically advanced than their teachers. In applied programs (Thelen, 1969) children with academic problems were often asked to teach material in their area of difficulty to younger children who were even less advanced in school work. Younger children are also less developed socially, which may contribute to the teacher's confidence in relating to them. The manner of interacting between teacher and pupil is an important determinant of the success of this procedure. In one study (Staub, 1975b; Staub et al., Note 12) responsiveness by the teacher to the pupil, which was related to responsiveness by the pupil to the teacher, was significantly related to the teacher's later prosocial behavior. The quality of the teacher's experience and what he learns from teaching may be affected by his own and his pupils' capacity for responsiveness. Finally, the qualities of the person who introduces the children to the activity and/or instructs them in teaching--particularly that person's warmth, nurturance, and responsiveness--are likely to be important. Staub et al. (Note 12) found that different experimenters differentially affected both children's responsiveness to each other and the teacher's subsequent prosocial behavior. These are issues that should be addressed in research and in applied programs.

Peer Influence on the Development of Prosocial Orientation

Most research and writing on the development of prosocial behavior has focused on socialization practices by adults and their laboratory analogues. Peers as socializers of each other's behavior tendencies, particularly prosocial behavior, have rarely been considered. Although we have extensive information about the manner in which peers influence one another's behavior in specific settings and at specific times (Hartup, 1970), little is known about long-term peer influence on children's personality development.

I will briefly mention some things we know about peer relations that seem relevant to the development of prosocial behavior, derived from an analysis presented elsewhere (Staub, 1978a). First, varied research findings indicate that reciprocity characterizes children's social behavior. Children who act positively toward other children, show social initiative, and behave in a friendly, positive, helpful, or considerate manner are usually the recipients of such behavior from their peers. Similarly, children who behave negatively are usually treated negatively. How such interactive cycles start and what their causal sequence is cannot be reasonably established from the research findings, which are correlational. It is probable that the direction of causality--from individual to peers or vice versa--can be either way. Popularity among children (as measured mainly by

sociometric indices, peer selection, and peer nomination) is also associated with positive, friendly behavior, among many other characteristics. Moreover, role-taking capacity is associated with popularity, probably because children who are skilled at role taking respond more sensitively to others.

A great deal of research should be conducted in this domain. Some--though sparse--data suggest that children who experience socialization practices promoting prosocial behavior tend to initiate positive, friendly behavior in interaction with peers (Baumrind, 1971; Hoffman, 1963). We need to know what characteristics in children (other than negative behavior) lead other children to behave negatively toward them. Children develop positive and negative reputations among their peers; what are their bases? Although the correlates of popularity have been extensively explored, there is scant knowledge of what combination of characteristics results in lasting negative reputation, dislike, or isolation by other children and what characteristics (apart from children's own negative behavior) elicit negative behavior from peers or inhibit peers from reciprocating a child's positive behavior.

A question of substantial importance for both research and application is how a negative reciprocal relationship between a child and his peers can be altered. What method of intervention will enable children to change their behavior

and begin to act positively toward others, so that the reciprocation of positive behavior will result? Alternatively, the process might start with other children: How can their behavior be altered so that they begin to act positively toward a child in a manner that results in reciprocation? These seem to be extremely important questions because long-lasting isolation by other children or reciprocal negative relationships can affect a child's orientation toward himself (e.g., his self-concept) and toward other people. Moreover, it may lead to firmly established negative strategies of interaction and lack of positive behavioral competencies.

A somewhat different issue that relates to peer interaction is that of cooperation and competition among children in everyday life. Research with laboratory games has shown that in our culture, competition increases with age, even competition of an "irrational" kind: Children try to stop their partners or opponents from winning, even if this makes it impossible for either of them to gain rewards (Kagan & Madsen, 1972; Madsen, 1971). Possibly irrational competition is the result of the nature of activities used in the research. At an early age children in our culture learn to play games in order to win.

We need to know whether American children develop similar competitive tendencies in other domains of interaction. In a recent observational study (as yet partially analyzed) of

children's interactions in their classroom, we found that cooperation was the single most frequent form of interaction (Staub, 1978a; Staub & Feinberg, Note 14). The domains of activity in which children are primarily cooperative or competitive, and the values and beliefs that guide their actions in these domains, have yet to be clarified.

Summary of Considerations for the Development of Prosocial Behavior in Children: Application of Existing Knowledge

The many research possibilities that I have suggested--sometimes in passing, sometimes in greater detail--cannot be usefully summarized. However, there are a few general proposals for training children in prosocial behavior and contributing to the development of their prosocial orientation that can be stated.

First, I would like to emphasize the significance of such activities. The socialization practices that contribute to a prosocial orientation are also likely to contribute to the development of positive self-concept and self-esteem; to the willingness to live by social rules and to do so comfortably; and to the capacity and tendency to interact with other people in a positive manner, contributing to harmony in a social group and to a satisfying personal adjustment. In addition, the consequences of such socialization (e.g., prosocial values, empathy), which in turn mediate prosocial

behavior, are also likely to minimize antisocial-aggressive behavior (Staub, 1971c).

One aspect of developing prosocial behavioral tendencies is the training of socializers. This training, aspects of which were detailed earlier, should include skills in interacting in nurturant, affectionate ways with children, as well as varied methods of control that are reasonable and relatively mild. Interestingly, such instruction can powerfully affect socializers' attitudes toward children. Training parents in mental health settings to act as behavior modifiers has successfully provided parents with skills to reinforce desirable behavior and exercise control over a previously uncontrolled child. This often leads to change in parental practices (from primarily punitive to primarily rewarding) and in attitudes toward the child (from hostile and vindictive to positive). Training of socializers in nurturance and control may provide skills in guiding children's interactions: e.g., enhancing responsiveness; using effectively simple, straightforward rules to get children to behave positively toward each other; and employing special practices in order to enhance prosocial behavior. Socializing agents should also learn to use positive reinforcement in a discriminative manner; to do so, they must learn to express affection and warmth in a manner different from specific reinforcement of the child's behavior. Guiding children's

behavior by reward is likely to have substantially different consequences from guiding them by punishment, but the former is only possible if reinforcement is used in a contingent manner. There is evidence that reinforcement in schools is used in a much less specific manner than punishment, thus reducing its effectiveness.

Another aspect of training in prosocial behavior is, of course, providing children with learning opportunities. These include the behavioral example of adults, reinforcement of prosocial behavior and punishment for its absence when circumstances require prosocial behavior, and specific rules to follow that guide prosocial responding. Learning opportunities also include special practices such as role playing, tutoring other children, discharging specific classroom obligations that benefit the class or certain classmates, leading children to participate in prosocial behavior outside the classroom, and discussing moral issues and the significance of the welfare of others in relation to world events or the children's own lives.

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SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: COMMENTS ON ERVIN STAUB'S PAPER

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The author briefly comments upon Staub's extensive review of children's helping behavior, particularly his focus on methodological and theoretical gaps in knowledge concerning prosocial behavior. In addition, questions are raised concerning the emphasis upon the training of moral judgments rather than behavior, the social-learning-theory focus upon dyadic interactions and behaviorally consistent models, the lack of knowledge concerning "real world" reinforcement of children's helping, and the lack of data concerning constraints upon children's helping.

I will confess at the outset that my comments contain less critique than observations. I am not a very good critic. Staub's paper is a scholarly one, and he and I share the same theoretical perspective. Finally, I would like to share some views which I hope but cannot guarantee are relevant to the mandate of this conference. Being short on criticisms and long on biases, I will briefly summarize and comment on Staub's paper and then present a few observations.

Staub has given us an excellent and comprehensive review of the literature directly related to the development or, at least, the elicitation of helping and altruistic behavior by children. He implicates a multitude of processes which are thought to be important in the development of a prosocial

orientation--a perspective in which children not only believe that the needy should be aided but also feel the personal responsibility to render such aid. Staub thus carefully reviews the literature pertaining to nurturance, values, cognitive states, models, the effects of particular discipline techniques, and contingent rewards and punishments as they might affect such an orientation. The hypotheses that he advances are reasonable, important, and testable. Staub also spells out the limits of our knowledge about such processes, indicating two unchallengeable features of the social-learning-theory literature on helping: first, that there are great gaps in our knowledge, both theoretical and methodological; second, that helping behavior is very complicated.

Knowledge Gaps

Staub correctly states that we know very little about children's perceptions of helpers or the needy; that the relationship between moral judgment and moral behavior is just now being studied; and that the personality characteristics of children and their socializers that may affect the development of a prosocial orientation have not yet been isolated. In fact, adequate measures of prosocial orientations are not available, although their development seems possible. There is a pressing need for measurement devices which assess an individual's willingness to lend aid to needy others in a

variety of situations and through a variety of means. We place too much emphasis upon the meaning of a single measure of helping and too little upon the impact of treatments across time and space. Several other gaps strike me as particularly important. I agree with Staub that we need to get into children's heads; i.e., we need to study attribution processes surrounding the child's perception of helpers and helped, even of the observer of a helping interchange. In addition, the relationship between children's moral judgment and moral behavior really has not been even superficially studied. Of the gaps to be filled, I would put least emphasis upon the relationship between children's personality characteristics and prosocial actions. This is not to say that personality characteristics are not importantly involved with such behavior; some no doubt are. However, efforts to establish such links have not yet yielded much knowledge because we have made erroneous guesses about which of the personality characteristics may be important, or because measures of such characteristics are primitive, or because situational influences on such behavior are so great as to overwhelm the impact of personality.

Complexity of Helping Behavior

With regard to the complexity of helping behavior, which Staub correctly points out, a key issue is the interaction

of the variables studied in affecting aiding. For example, some tasks affect boys and girls differently; the effects of social approval depend upon who is giving that approval and, no doubt, who is receiving it. The impact of any particular variable in affecting helping is greatly dependent upon the context of other variables operating at the time. Alas, it is a complicated affair, this development of prosocial behavior, and Staub does an admirable job of describing research efforts in the area.

Moral Judgment versus Moral Behavior

At this point I would like to add some thoughts of my own. The development of prosocial behavior is critically important. The self-destruct rate of our society--in the form of medical illness, suicide, crime, poverty, pollution, and waste of precious resources, both human and nonhuman--appears to be accelerating (Zimbardo, 1969; London, Note 1). The study and development of prosocial behavior are worthy of our time and resources. Be that agreed, then the question becomes: How should we spend these resources?

Staub's review of the literature provides us with the biases of the material and of the researchers. There are several distinct emphases of the social-learning-theory approach to prosocial activity that should be noted. The most significant of these is an emphasis upon deeds. Usually the

criterion for assuming prosocial orientations is behavior rather than cognitions. This does not mean that cognitive processes are either irrelevant or unimportant; ultimately, however, helping behavior rather than statements concerning either proprieties or principles is critical.

I believe that this emphasis should be particularly noted for two reasons. First, it may be that the current trend in moral education is to place stress upon the development of moral judgment, perhaps to the neglect of moral behaviors. Moral judgments are important in their own right and rightly deserve development, but it is possible that advanced moral judgments may well be unaccompanied by prosocial actions. It is my belief that we should be careful about assuming a strong bond between the judgment and the action and should pay particular attention to developing an association of moral cognition and moral deeds.

Second, the emphasis upon behavior rather than upon judgmental processes gives rise to perhaps greater controversy. It is my guess that political acceptance of affecting moral judgments may well be greater than that of affecting behaviors. In the abstract, almost everyone approves the notion that one should be helpful to others, generous to the needy, supportive of the miserable. But also, one should get ahead (often at the expense of another), mind one's own business, become independent, and avoid commercial or interpersonal

exploitation (i.e., don't be a sucker). Now, in the abstract, the teaching of these values may not be particularly troublesome to the public, since their implications for particular forms of behavior within given settings are not carefully dictated by trainers. Moreover, insofar as moral training within the classroom and home is conducted in a protected milieu, then arranging these values in terms of priorities need not be faced; controversy can be avoided. It will surprise no one, however, that when the target behaviors are specified, controversy may markedly increase.

Let me give you two examples of the difficulties in training behavior. The first involves an investigator who has been studying the development of prosocial behavior for an extended period. Recently his academic institution received a letter from the federal government which indicated that, in someone's judgment, the investigator was exposing the children used in his studies to high risk, i.e., risks not ordinarily encountered in the subjects' everyday existence. The sole risk cited was that exposing children to a generous, helping model would increase the likelihood that the children would become generous, not only immediately but in the future as well. It was felt that this would perhaps violate the children's values. On the advice of legal counsel, the researcher has closed up his shop.

The second illustration involves an attempt to devise

several television presentations intended to provide some character education. A conference was convened, and in attendance were performers, producers, social scientists, and "angels," all reasonable, intelligent, and concerned people. When suggestions were made that cooperation and helping behavior might be a theme for the series, serious objections were offered. The argument against such a theme was that children might become too cooperative, too conforming to the injustices around them, too willing to accept authority. There was a bit more consensus about teaching competence to the viewing child, since competence at what was not defined. While in the abstract everyone wanted to increase children's prosocial behavior, concrete plans were not developed.

What troubles me about such incidents is the possibility that the most important value shared among parents is that of having complete autonomy over the moral training of their children (London, Note 1). People want privacy; ergo, do not ask about mother-child relationships. People want constructive rebellion; ergo, do not teach cooperation. People, even children, value greed; ergo, do not teach generosity.

If I am correct in this analysis, then morality as well as the training methods must be defined at the community level and be subject to the approval of a cooperative and informed local public. The implementation of moral-behavior training may be subject to considerable controversy and may

require unusual political efforts for its success.

Dyadic Interactions and Consistent Models

Another feature of the literature on social-learning theory concerning children's aiding should be noted: the use of dyadic interactions as the analogue of important human socialization events. Study after study has been conducted on the influence of models and mothers. I think that such an emphasis is entirely correct. Of particular importance is the message that comes from the social-learning studies of modeling, namely, that as socializers we must pay more attention to our own behaviors; children clearly do not learn by words alone. There are several points, however, that I would like to raise about this emphasis on dyads. Much of the child's life is spent in other than dyadic interpersonal situations. Children are frequently within group contexts, and even when not part of a group, they often observe the simultaneous behaviors of many people. We have spent few man-hours investigating the role of multiple models in affecting helping behavior. Furthermore, models of charity are often inconsistent in their words and deeds and in their deeds across time. We know very little about the impact of such inconsistency upon the observing child. Much more attention should be paid to it, whether in the form of between-model or within-model behaviors.

There are two further points that I would like to make about mothers and the family unit as a socialization mechanism. First, we know that models, even if they are parents, are important as a source of learning to the child. We also know that the types of models to which children are being exposed are changing. Single-parent families are increasing, and thus parental models are fewer in number. The television model is increasing in importance, if importance can be measured by children's time spent watching television. Moreover, if Reiss (Note 2) is correct in his assertions, the urban-dwelling child is decreasingly supervised by and exposed to consistent adult models and increasingly exposed to and controlled by peer models. The maternal and paternal models are no doubt important, but the degree to which the child is being deprived of such models must be examined. If the burden of the socialization of the child is gradually shifting away from the family, who, if anyone, is assuming it? Who should assume it, and how should it be handled? I think that the burden of socialization should be increasingly assumed by the schoolteacher.

The second consideration about the family unit as a socialization mechanism is whether it is the most, or the only, efficient training device. Perhaps we should be somewhat more oriented toward studies concerning application than we have been heretofore. I wish to digress at this point and

discuss contemporary mental helping activities as a means of making my point. Individual psychotherapy and various behavior-modification techniques have been useful in alleviating a variety of miseries that plague our fellow citizens. The latter techniques have become increasingly effective and will, no doubt, continue to be. But I wonder whether other forms of education would not yield similar results in a more efficient manner. We know that affect and conduct can be changed by means of television (Bryan & Schwartz, 1971; Stein & Friedrich, 1975) and radio (Veitch, DeWood, & Bosko, Note 3). We can and do teach reading, writing, and arithmetic to increasingly large groups of children, and videotaped messages are common in the classrooms of large universities. I see no reason to assume that prosocial behavior cannot be taught in much the same fashion, i.e., to large groups of individuals. It is my belief, then, that some of the bounty should be distributed to researchers interested in developing training devices applicable to many clients at a time rather than to single individuals.

"Real World" Reinforcement

A further feature of the psychological literature is the emphasis upon the impact of reinforcements in governing behavior and the often implicit assumption that there is public support for such contingencies. Essentially it is believed

that if a behavior is desirable, then that behavior, once it is shaped, will continue to be reinforced by the general public; that, in effect, there is continuity in reinforcement activities, from home or laboratory to the streets. The continuity assumption, however, has really been more a matter of faith than fact. We know very little about the consequences to children of helping behavior within naturalistic settings. In one study that I conducted, only 1 adult in 80 gave any form of approval when witnessing a child donate money to the March of Dimes. As far as I know, there have been no investigations as to how children's helping acts are treated by either parents or teachers.

On the other side of the coin, I am surprised that there is so little information concerning children's expectancies of rewards. In a study where we allowed children to leave a message for a person of their choice, only about half of the children who donated money to the March of Dimes even mentioned the donation in their message. If the children were helping with the expectation of some reward, relatively few initiated actions which would facilitate obtaining it. In another study now in progress, my students and I have been looking at helping behavior exhibited in the weekend cartoons for several years. While the data are not in a form that I would publish, I suspect that helping behavior is more frequently rewarded than aggressive action, but not much more

so. The cartoon hero thus presents a very mixed bag to the viewer. It is my belief that we very much need some descriptive information concerning public responses to the helping child.

Constraints of Helping

I have suggested the need for research of an applied and descriptive nature. In addition, I would like to suggest one other focus for investigation: constraints of helping. Laboratory studies have consistently shown that children become greater helpers as they grow older, at least up to the age of about 11. So far, this implies that whatever is going on in producing the helping child--and by whomever--it is effective.

However, two studies, one conducted in a naturalistic setting and the other in a laboratory, have produced results which are disturbing. Severy and Davis (1971) found that both age and relatively advanced cognitive development may retard rather than facilitate helping. In another study (Bryan & Bryan, Note 4), it was found that learning-disabled children were more helpful than non-learning-disabled children.

Perhaps disabled or "immature" children are more helpful because they receive greater help and thus are more frequently exposed to helping models; or because they have more

empathy for other disabled children; or because they receive more tutorials concerning helping. It is just as likely, however, that our society generally eliminates the prosocial action of the older child which it so carefully fosters in the younger one.

What forces constrain helping? Competition, aggression, and self-image have been implicated. But we know very little of the values, interpersonal relationships, and physical settings which attenuate helping in the maturing child.

While we are in great need of descriptive data concerning helping, I think that it would be particularly useful to study empirically teacher classroom behaviors vis-à-vis helping actions. Do we know just how much socialization effort is expended by the teacher, particularly in the areas of cooperation and helping? I think not, although my guess would be that even unwitting efforts in such directions are extremely infrequent. Before teacher-training efforts are implemented, we should be aware of just what is happening within the classroom.

Generality and Durability

One last point: As Staub indicates, we know little about the generality and the durability of many treatments which promote prosocial activity within a circumscribed setting. I think there is reason to believe that some treatments

can be economically devised which will lead to prosocial orientations in a variety of settings. The technology is now available; given public acceptance, it could be utilized in increasing prosocial actions.

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EVALUATING SOCIAL-LEARNING THEORY AS A BASIS FOR MORAL
EDUCATION: COMMENTS ON ERVIN STAUB'S PAPER

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The author presents a positive critique of Staub's paper. He views Staub's analysis as providing both a practical and theoretical basis for instructional programs in moral education. He interprets Staub as moving towards a highly cognitive-based form of social-learning theory. This interpretation is based on Staub's extensive use of a prosocial values orientation as a basic causative element between experience and prosocial action. Staub's paper is seen as practical in that it provides explicit techniques to develop and enhance prosocial action. Among other techniques, the author discusses role playing, participatory experiences, modeling, induction, and peer influences. Evaluation of Staub's proposals in natural field or educational settings is advocated.

Ervin Staub has emerged as an outstanding scholar investigating human morality. His competence and familiarity with basic research are apparent from the breadth of his references and the scope of his own writings. Furthermore, while Staub has not directly set out to establish a theory of prosocial behavior, it appears that his attempts to integrate empirical data naturally lead to the development of a theoretical framework for the analysis and discussion of moral behavior. While, as a psychologist, I would find it stimulating to explore the empirical and theoretical nuances of Staub's paper, this review will confine itself to his focus

on educational research and application.

Morality is defined by Staub as helping others. While some would find such a definition too narrow, it includes the bulk of behaviors most people refer to when discussing morality. Out of the definition, the term prosocial behavior naturally evolves. This term may be of particular importance for educators finding resistance to programs labeled moral or character education, since educating for prosocial behavior sounds innocuous and inoffensive. With regard to public acceptance of moral-education programs, it is difficult to be against prosocial behavior.

The term prosocial behavior offers the further advantage of focusing on specific behaviors. Because of this, Staub is able to make a double assertion, perhaps assumption, at the beginning of his paper that is valuable for educators designing objectives for instructional programs--i.e., behavior is both consistent and predictable. While Staub cites references to support the assertion that behavior is consistent, he draws upon general beliefs in science to justify the assertion of the predictability of behavior.

Staub goes on to propose that prosocial values cause prosocial action. This is perhaps the weakest part of his paper, since strong supporting data are simply not available. There is an intuitive credibility to his argument that a prosocial values orientation, based on concern for others and a

felt sense of responsibility, can be a legitimate base upon which prosocial actions are built. Such an orientation leads to the development of prosocial goals. Staub discusses how multiple goals may be in conflict, making prediction difficult but nevertheless still possible. He adds the notion of competency in behavior and stresses that a prosocial values orientation could lead to individual behavioral competency across many situations. He also discusses how this orientation can explain the belief in the generality of prosocial actions as well as the way in which people discriminate between when to act prosocially and when it is not productive or desirable to extend help to others.

As one reads Staub and compares him with traditional social-learning theorists, a trend is unmistakable: An increasingly important role is being given to personality, or individual differences. Staub is perhaps reflecting the forefront of this general movement within social-learning theory by emphasizing the importance of a values orientation as a causative agent for prosocial action. The acquisition of this orientation appears to be the most basic learning goal from a theoretical perspective. In fact, Staub implies that a basic values orientation might combine with empathy to form a single entity, causing people to act prosocially. This combined entity takes into account both the cognitive and affective personality bases for predicting prosocial

behavior. Further development of this notion may have long-range significance. It would certainly add to Staub's overall views, since he has seemed to give too little importance to the affective base of behavior.

Considering the importance Staub places on a values orientation, it may be advisable to consider including recent research and theory on values in his overall model. This author would suggest the recent work by Rokeach (1973) as a beginning. In addition, as Staub notes, we lack valid assessment measures for determining personality variables. Nonetheless, Staub's model or miniature theory for prosocial behavior is the best currently available. In terms of parsimony, empirical basis, and general intuitive appeal, there seems to be no other of comparable worth for designers of instructional programs for moral behavior.

Educational Implications

As we have seen, Staub considers prosocial behaviors the result of basic acquisition processes, as do other social-learning theorists. He reviews research that demonstrates how moral behaviors result from classical and operant conditioning. However, Staub questions a direct conditioning approach because it tends to ignore the issue of internal motivation. He then introduces more cognitive elements and asks how conditioning practices can develop positive cognitions.

His concern with motivation and personality leads him to consider other less direct acquisition processes.

Nurturance

The first acquisition element (somewhat surprisingly) is nurturance. After reviewing a critical study (Yarrow, Scott, & Waxler, 1973), he implies that contact with a nurturant adult caretaker is an important step in a child's acquisition of prosocial behavior. Briefly, he lists findings/reasons for this implication (e.g., the child feeling good about himself, having the freedom to act without fear of punishment, identifying with the adult, and being able to learn more from other forms of instruction). Staub is aware of research showing that nurturance must be combined with minimal amounts of control and expectations; however, he still considers nurturance initially an important causative agent that may facilitate the later effects of verbal communication, modeling, attention, and participatory activities (see below). While the field practitioner would probably not overlook facets of adult-child interaction such as nurturance, it is to Staub's credit that this basic first step is clearly identified.

Staub notes the lack of research describing the kind of activities that can be used to teach caretakers how to be nurturant. Perhaps this sort of information can be drawn from other areas of teacher education. In describing the

nurturant relationship, Staub states that, consistent with research findings:

Reasonable, effective, but nonrestrictive control is important;...the control must be flexible in form, adapting to the child's behavior; and... such control, while it can sometimes be forceful, should be minimally forceful and applied in a manner that will not alienate the child. Thus future control will not become more difficult, and the emotional orientation of the child will not be affected negatively. Probably this philosophy will only be put into practice if socializing agents also learn variable means of control, developing appropriate skills in guiding children.

Next in importance to the nurturant relationship is modeling. Staub addresses with insight some considerations for the use of modeling techniques. Educators have long been aware of the importance of providing models for children; an analysis of the research literature makes it possible to further refine the technique by identifying specific elements that will enhance the model's effect. Since Staub does not examine these facilitating elements, the reader would be well advised to turn to the writings of other social-learning theorists for more detailed information about the modeling process (e.g., Bandura, 1971).

Reasoning

The role of reasoning, according to Staub, is critical in the development of prosocial behavior. Nonetheless, he warns against the didactic approach commonly called preaching and favorably reviews the induction approach proposed by Hoffman

(1970). He points out many mitigating factors and raises questions regarding how direct a reasoning approach should be. Data are obviously lacking in this area.

Participation

Staub's discussion of participation constitutes an important and creative contribution to the field of moral education. Dividing participation into three types--assignment of responsibility, role playing, and indirect learning--Staub provides some practical guidance and constructional outlines. For example, he points out the consequences of role playing: First, students learn specific acts; second, they acquire social-interaction skills; third, they undergo some psychological change or development; and fourth, they become less egocentric. In addition, he identifies ways of establishing role playing, such as the use or nonuse of scripts, a focus on specific acts, or an emphasis on general motives and goals. Furthermore, he points out some practical techniques, e.g., varying, repeating, and exchanging roles. Staub provides well-grounded data in this area, and the role-playing method emerges as a key element in instructional programs.

Children tutoring or collaborating with a responsible adult to take care of other children are two indirect participatory-learning experiences. Staub has conducted pioneer research in this domain. While acknowledging some problems,

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he obviously feels that the advantages of these techniques far outweigh their disadvantages. In particular, he points out that this approach usually eliminates the negative reactance often elicited by direct instruction.

Role of Peers

Finally, Staub introduces the role of peers in the development of a prosocial orientation. This reviewer, while recognizing the potential of peer influence, especially during the junior and senior high school ages, would urge caution in the use of peer activities until a thorough review of the research is available. It may be particularly beneficial to look at Soviet methods of character education and other research on peer influences. Staub hints at the negative effects of competition; his concern is shared by this reviewer. The negative effects of competition-based educational programs on the development of prosocial cooperative behavior are serious considerations for our public schools.

Summary

Staub consistently emphasizes the crucial role of the socializing adult caretaking agent, pointing out that program development is dependent upon the selection of appropriate teachers. In this personal-social area, instructional designers must recognize that certain teacher skills and characteristics may be necessary to a successful program for

developing prosocial behaviors. In particular, the teacher's ability to handle nurturance and control seems critical.

A general theme throughout Staub's paper is the need for more research, especially more extensive research. He is concerned about the predominance of small laboratory studies as opposed to large-scale field testing (a criticism which he levels against some of his own research as well as that of others). He also stresses the need for research on personality differences and cites the Gelfand study as an important contribution (Gelfand, Hartman, Cromer, Smith, & Page, 1975).

A partial answer to his research concerns might be the implementation and testing of his proposals in educational settings as part of a large instructional program. This reviewer believes that the development of instructional programs should go hand in hand with basic research development rather than wait for the completion of adequate basic research. This suggestion, growing out of Staub's model for the development of educational programs as part of the field-testing of theory, may be particularly realistic when one considers that Staub argues for an indirect as opposed to a direct approach for the development of prosocial behavior. Recall that he does not advocate the use of classical and operant conditioning techniques, which are by far the most advanced technology of the social-learning theorist. Instead, he proposes modeling, reasoning, and participatory

activities (such as role playing, the assignment of responsibility, and indirect learning) as the desired acquisition processes.

While the range of responses that Staub addresses clearly falls within the definition of prosocial behavior, he also recognizes the need for accompanying cognitions and feelings. While cognitions are precursors for moral actions, their development, according to his theory, seems to follow behavior in a natural way. That is, he implies that when indirect methods are used to bring about behavioral prosocial change, the necessary cognitions and feelings will, seemingly, evolve naturally. This implication should be of interest to educators searching for workable programs that will gain public acceptance.

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PERSON VARIABLES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROSOCIAL
TENDENCIES: COMMENTS ON ERVIN STAUB'S PAPER

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The author comments on Staub's paper with particular reference to three interrelated topics: (a) the person variables which Staub argues determine prosocial conduct; (b) the consistency of prosocial behavior across situations; and (c) the factors which Staub suggests affect the development of prosocial tendencies. Staub's person variables are given special attention because they are different from the traditional demographic variables and global personality traits usually considered in personality research. These variables, primarily attributed to cognitive social-learning theory, include general values, empathy, competencies, personal constructs, expectancies, and self-regulatory systems and plans. Each is commented upon in turn. The second topic with which the paper deals, consistency in prosocial behavior across diverse situations, is briefly considered from the viewpoint of both theoretical issues and recent empirical results. Implications for research on prosocial behavior are pointed out. The final section includes a brief summary and commentary on Staub's specific proposals for the development of prosocial tendencies.

Staub's paper is a cornucopia of intriguing ideas on the personality determinants of prosocial actions and the development of prosocial tendencies. I would like to begin with his discussion of personality determinants for two reasons. First, I agree with Staub that "to understand development, we need to consider the determinants of prosocial behavior, the personality characteristics that must develop if children and

adults are to behave prosocially." It is these person variables, after all, that we want to influence when we seek to develop prosocial tendencies in children.

Second, the variables cited by Staub are of a fundamentally different sort than the demographic characteristics (e.g., age, sex, socioeconomic status, ethnicity) and global personality traits (e.g., competitiveness, aggressiveness, social responsibility) that are typically employed in the prosocial domain (see reviews by Bryan, 1975; Bryan & London, 1970; Krebs, 1970). Because they are different, and because I think they have greater utility, they deserve special attention. Staub's person variables include an individual's values or desires, competencies, personal constructs, expectancies or beliefs about outcomes, and self-regulatory systems and plans. They deal directly with the cognitive and affective processes within the individual that (I would argue) determine his actions. They are not summary labels which must in turn be explained, nor are they externally defined stimulus manipulations. I believe that these "purposive-cognitive" variables (Alston, 1975) are the ones that we need to look at if we are to understand human actions.

Unfortunately, however, Staub only lightly sketches the nature of these constructs and the cognitive social-learning theory to which he largely attributes them. A clearer picture of the concepts and theory may be obtained from other

writings by Staub (1974, 1975), Mischel (1971, 1973), and Mischel and Mischel (1976). An alternative view of similar concepts can be found in Alston (1970, 1975), Atkinson and Birch (1970), and Taylor (1964).

Person Variables

One of the major person variables that Staub stresses is prosocial orientation. This consists of an emphasis on the welfare of others and a sense of personal responsibility for them. Although I agree in principle with Staub that this orientation is an important determinant of prosocial behavior, one of the major difficulties (in both this area and the general domain of moral behavior) has been the failure to demonstrate a relationship between professed values and overt actions (Adkins, Payne, & O'Malley, 1974). There are many reasons for this difficulty, not the least of which is the multiply determined nature of human actions; however, one of the most important reasons, I suspect, is the inadequacy of conventional measures of values. Most of these measures simply ask respondents to indicate their level of agreement with a series of verbal statements. But as Kohlberg (1969) emphasized, there is a strong tendency for people to agree with positive-sounding moral precepts. Kohlberg is therefore right to assess moral judgment by requiring respondents to create their own responses rather than merely to indicate

degree of concurrence with statements conceived by the researcher.

But the problems with self-report go deeper than that. Various studies (e.g., Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967; Freeman & Atav, 1960; Hartig & Kanfer, 1973; Tittle & Hill, 1967) have demonstrated the obvious fact that self-report, regardless of the response format, can and will be distorted if it serves the interests of the respondent. Naturally, distortion is especially likely when researchers inquire into an individual's moral values. We therefore need to discover better ways of learning about people's values; in particular, we need to give greater attention to the dynamics of self-report and to the possible characteristics of the self-report setting and process that might induce people to provide more accurate data. We should also investigate the structural relationships among the many proposed values systems, such as Kohlberg's (1969) six stages of moral judgment, Staub's prosocial orientation, and Hogan's (1973) survey of ethical attitudes.

A second of Staub's person variables, also concerned with the motivational base of prosocial behavior, is the individual's degree of empathy--"the capacity and tendency to experience others' emotional states vicariously." This affective state has been emphasized by a number of reviewers (e.g., Bryan, 1975; Bryan & London, 1970; Krebs, 1970) as important

to prosocial behavior. The significance of this variable seems beyond question. I agree with Staub, however, that we need better measures of the construct and that researchers should demonstrate that a particular experimental manipulation produced an empathic reaction, rather than merely assume that it did.

Another affective state which has received some limited attention in the prosocial area, but which is not mentioned by Staub, is guilt. In studies with adults certain experimental manipulations assumed to produce guilt were found to increase prosocial activity (Krebs, 1970); in studies with children, however, no such tendency has been discovered, although in one study "image reparation" was suggested as a possible reason for prosocial behavior (Isen, Rosenhan, & Horn, 1973). Regardless of whether negative states such as guilt or shame affect prosocial activity, the important point is that the issue seems devoid of positive implications for development of prosocial tendencies in children.

A third major person variable suggested by Staub is behavioral and cognitive competencies--the individual's skills and abilities. Although Staub talks specifically about only one kind of competency--role-taking ability--he refers in various places to the need for the individual to have the ability to provide help and the necessary competency to reach a desired outcome. In many cases, of course, people will be

roughly equivalent in ability, but there are situations, particularly those involving rescue of someone in distress, in which perceived competency might be crucial. At a more subtle level, a number of potential helpers may have the ability to perform a needed action, but those who have done it before are more likely to have the necessary confidence to do it again. Thus, one of the major advantages of exposing children to structured or unstructured responsibility assignment, role playing, and tutoring of other children would be to help them develop confidence in their competencies to perform certain roles when the need arises. By the way, since role-taking ability (the capacity to view events as others see them) may be crucial to the development of empathy and prosocial tendencies, it seems particularly important that children acquire this capacity. More than likely, its development will be facilitated by discussing the values and dilemmas of other people and by placing the individual in a variety of different roles.

A fourth type of person variable included in cognitive social-learning theory, but not explicitly mentioned by Staub, is the individual's personal constructs (Kelly, 1955; Mischel, 1973). This term refers to how individuals construe their own characteristics, the traits and other dispositions they use in explaining and describing behavior, and the constructs they use in categorizing events. I assume that Staub

is talking about personal constructs when he refers to the importance of an individual's attitudes toward different recipients in determining generosity toward them. A person's attitudes about the worthiness or needs of recipients are undoubtedly crucial determinants of his prosocial behavior and must be recognized in its measurement. This is particularly important in the measurement of individual differences, whereby different attitudes toward a "standard" recipient might easily produce pseudo-differences in prosocial tendencies.

A fifth variable is expected outcomes of behavior. As Staub argues, young children may behave prosocially because they expect material or social rewards; older children may behave prosocially because they expect the experience of a pleasant empathic response. Expected outcomes, then, should be extremely important in determining the actions of children. From the point of view of research, greater emphasis should be placed on measuring expectations in the experimental context. From the point of view of development of prosocial tendencies, anything that can be done to increase the child's expectations of positive consequences from engaging in prosocial behavior will increase such tendencies. Of course, in many situations such expectations may depend on the prior development of empathy for others and valuation of their welfare. In other situations, however, or for

individuals without the necessary prosocial motives, social or material rewards should perhaps be provided.

The final person variable mentioned by Staub concerns the individual's "self-regulatory systems and plans" (Mischel, 1973). These include self-imposed goals and standards and self-criticism and self-satisfaction in response to behavior directed toward those goals. Staub contends that as children grow older they may increasingly develop internal standards dictating that they should behave prosocially toward others; they may then reward or punish themselves according to how they meet those standards. Such internalized systems should exercise a major force on what children do in particular situations, as well as what types of situations they seek out.

Consistency in Prosocial Actions

According to Staub's view, prosocial behavior is determined by an individual's values, empathy, competencies, personal constructs, expectancies, and self-regulatory systems. What a person does in a particular situation is determined by the interaction of these variables with the perceived characteristics of the situation. Therefore, the same external situation may evoke different responses from different individuals because each one's perceptions interact with his unique person variables. Furthermore, what a particular individual does in a situation may involve the resolution of

inner competing tendencies, as illustrated in Staub's example of a child who must choose between the simultaneous desire to help someone else and to do well on a task requiring complete attention. Finally, individuals will not necessarily exhibit a high degree of consistency across different situations because each situation may evoke different values, expectancies, and so on.

In view of this theory, it is not surprising that Staub argues against expecting a high or even moderate degree of consistency in prosocial behavior across different situations. This is an important point because many personality theorists in the past have expected high degrees of trans-situational generality. Moreover, in a recent review of the prosocial literature, Bryan (1975) seems to imply that prosocial behaviors in the natural environment may be moderately interrelated.

It is my belief, however, that we should not expect moderate to high relationships when diverse prosocial behaviors are measured directly rather than by means of ratings. My reasons for this belief are, first, that five decades of research in the related area of resistance to temptation have failed to demonstrate such relationships (Adkins et al., 1974). Second, carefully conducted studies involving contrived situational measures in the prosocial area have likewise failed to demonstrate such relationships. A study which

I recently completed (Payne, Note 1), which included five measures of prosocial behavior, is particularly instructive in this regard. The average intercorrelation among the measures, which were administered to 41 fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-grade children, was a nonsignificant .15. Equally revealing, the five measures split into two clusters that were essentially uncorrelated with each other. The average intercorrelation within one cluster, which consisted of tasks requiring anonymous donation of goods or work to physically absent strangers, was .41; the correlation between the other two tasks, which involved giving goods to physically present classmates, was also .41. What this study reveals quite clearly, I think, is that correlations between behavior on prosocial tasks can be zero if the measures are sufficiently different. I find this reasonable. Prosocial behavior is, after all, only a label that we attach to a potentially very broad class of behaviors. If the situations that we say measure prosocial behavior evoke different cognitive and affective responses from a sample of research participants, we may not even obtain low positive correlations. Of course, from a psychometric point of view, we may argue that such measures are not adequate indices of some unidimensional construct. The fault, however, may lie in the construct, not the individual measures.

This variation in behavior across situations has several

important implications. First, the dimensionality of prosocial situations--the characteristics of situations that tend to evoke similar responses from the majority of individuals--should be explored. For instance, in the study I cited above (Payne, Note 1), many children reacted differently to situations involving physically absent strangers than they did to those involving physically present classmates--even though tasks in both cases involved anonymous giving. Measurement of prosocial behavior has in general been too limited in approach (primarily to contrived situations) and in the types of behaviors dealt with (primarily with donation and rescue behavior). At this point, as both Staub and Bryan (1975) have suggested, we need a great deal more diversity.

The second implication is that in attempting to assess an individual's prosocial tendencies, we must realize that measurement of behavior in one or even several situations will provide an inadequate index of the global trait. This is most important if we are attempting to arrive at statements regarding individual differences.

Third, in investigations of situational determinants of prosocial behavior or factors affecting development, the potentially different psychological processes evoked by different types of situations may reduce the generality of relationships. A good example of this effect is the different results reported in the literature (Adkins et al., 1974)

regarding the effect of the emotional warmth of the model on rescue and donation behavior.

Development of Prosocial Behavior

Turning to the development of prosocial behavior, I find Staub's ideas extremely compelling. He does an excellent job of pulling together diverse research findings to provide a penetrating view of development. He manages to cover virtually all of the major ideas regarding potential sources of influence, and in addition he suggests ways in which socialization experiences may affect prosocial tendencies through their influence on one or more of his person variables. Nevertheless, Staub's creative synthesis of diverse and often contradictory findings suffers from one drawback, which Staub himself indicates throughout the paper: His conclusions are often based on a weak empirical base and are therefore highly speculative. As a stimulant to further research, however, Staub's assertions have a great deal to recommend them.

In terms of specific proposals, Staub begins by arguing that the socialization agent should (a) be warm and affectionate toward the child; (b) exercise control over the child that is "reasonable" (i.e., should not be resented); and (c) practice flexible and variable means of control. With regard to the first point, the research literature has revealed that nurturance on the part of models does not always

result in increased prosocial behavior. In fact, in laboratory studies of donation behavior, just the opposite has frequently occurred (Adkins et al., 1974; Bryan, 1975). Staub counters these findings by emphasizing the length of relationship between the socialization agent and the child: If there has not been a prior history of a warm and affectionate relationship combined with the exercise of control, warmth may only communicate permissiveness to the child. This is an appealing argument, but it requires further research before we can place any confidence in it. Staub's second point (primarily an application of dissonance theory) and his third point both appear intuitively reasonable, but they warrant further study.

All three of these propositions, by the way, reinforce Staub's plea for more studies of the interaction between children and socialization agents in the natural environment. I strongly agree with this suggestion, and I would add that until we can be more sure of the accuracy of parental report (see Yarrow, Campbell, & Burton, 1968), such studies should rely on behavioral observation. From a methodological point of view, however, I think parental and child report should be included in such studies to allow further exploration of the relationship between verbal report and observational sources of data. It should be emphasized that naturalistic behavioral observation can provide an excellent source of creative

insights into the nature of parent-child interactions. I would argue, therefore, that some behavioral observations should be directed towards discovery rather than narrow confirmation of hypotheses derived from cultural stereotypes or existing psychological speculations.

Staub's second proposal is that socialization agents should apply external rewards and punishments at a minimal level to produce compliance. This approach, derived from dissonance theory and self-perception theory, is expected to avoid rejection on the part of children. In addition, it is intended to lead children to accept the prosocial behavior as part of their values and standards. Again, this is a reasonable argument, and, again, it deserves to be researched in the natural environment.

Modeling--or the observation of behavioral examples provided by others--is the third element related to development that Staub considers. The status of short-term modeling effects is uncontested, and recent research in the prosocial domain as well as in other areas (cited by Staub) has begun to allay fears that the effects of modeling are only short-term. The influence of models' characteristics on subsequent behavior of the observer, however, is not clear and requires much further research, as Staub suggests.

The fourth element related to development concerns reasoning, induction, and moral exhortation. With regard to the

last, there are now a good many laboratory studies indicating that simple verbal pronouncements about how people should in general behave (preaching) have no effect on subsequent behavior. That does not include direct commands by a socialization agent, which, not surprisingly, have been shown to be highly effective. With regard to reasoning and induction, Staub argues strongly for their effectiveness and places primary emphasis on results from so-called "naturalistic studies" (e.g., Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967; Mussen, Harris, Ruth-erford, & Keasey, 1970). Unfortunately, although I find it difficult to argue against anything so appealing as reasoning and induction, I would like to point out that the "natural-istic studies" cited by Staub did not involve actual obser-vation of parental practices; rather, they were based upon parental report of such practices. The dangers involved in using traditional measures of parental report have been well documented elsewhere (Yarrow et al., 1968). Moreover, the "naturalistic" data themselves have been far from consistent (Adkins et al., 1974). Nevertheless, some of the evidence cited by Staub, as well as many theoretical arguments, sup-ports the importance of reasoning, and it therefore remains a legitimate emphasis. It also fits well with Kohlberg's (1969) arguments. I might add that I agree with Staub that the resolution of this issue may well lie in conducting more careful studies of the pattern of parental practices and

perhaps the nature of the long-standing relationship between the parent and child.

The final major element Staub deals with is participation in prosocial experiences. He divides these into three categories: (a) performance of assigned duties or carrying out a direct order to do something; (b) participation in role-playing experiences; and (c) participation in "interactive life experiences" which, like peer tutoring, may be inherently rewarding. In his emphasis on participation, Staub is at least partially in agreement with cognitive-developmental theorists such as Kohlberg (1969) and stresses an especially important element of development. In particular, it should be noted that, as Staub points out, such experiences may have wide-ranging effects on children's personalities: Children's standards, values, and views of themselves may be altered, and they may develop the necessary behavioral competencies to perform a variety of prosocial acts. The last two types of participation may also help develop role-taking ability and empathic capacity. To strengthen empathic capacity, by the way, I think it would be wise to couple such experiences with discussions of the demands made upon members of different role positions and the feelings of people occupying different roles.

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Reference Note

1. Payne, F.D. Assessment of altruism in children. Final report to the National Institute of Education, Washington, D.C., November 1975.

BIOGRAPHIES

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